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INTRODUCTION

On March 5, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush imposed
definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel
products pursuant to his authority under Section 203 of the
Trade Act of 1974 ("Trade Act"). 2 The U.S. steel safeguard
measure entailed the application of ad valorem tariffs ranging
from 8% to 30% on various types of steel products. 3 The
President's decision came following the recommendation of the
U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC"), which conducted
an investigation concluding that such steel products were "being
imported . . . in such increased quantities as to be a substantial
cause of serious injury . . . to the domestic industry."4 The
safeguard measure was intended to thereby provide what the
President and the ITC viewed as appropriate and necessary relief
to the U.S. steel industry. 5 The safeguard measure went into
effect on March 20, 2002, and was to remain in place for a period
6
of three years and one day.
The adverse effects of the safeguard measure on steel
exporting nations made an international trade war all but
inevitable. As a WTO Member, the United States is obligated to
impose safeguard measures only within the legal parameters of
the General Agreement on Trade Tariffs of 19477 ("GATT"' ) and
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards 8 ("Safeguards Agreement").
From the outset, the President defended the safeguard measure
2 Proclamation No. 7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (Mar. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Steel
Products Proclamation].
3 See Action Under Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 Concerning Certain Steel
Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,593 (Mar. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Section 203 Action] (citing
safeguard measures showing individual ad valorem tariff increases ranging from 8% to
30%).
4 Steel, USITC Pub. 3479, Inv. No. TA-201-73, 1 (Dec. 2001).
5 See Steel Products Proclamation, supra note 2, at 10,554-56 (noting the concern
about addressing "the serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic industries"); Press
Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Announces Temporary
Safeguards for Steel Industry (Mar. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Press Release], available at
(claiming that the
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020305-6.html
President considered section 203 of Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. 2252(e), and ITC supplemental
report in his determination of safeguard measures).
6 Steel Products Proclamation, supra note 2, at 10,555 (stating that tariff rate quotas
on imports would last for 3 years plus 1 day).
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATTI.
8 Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
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as "expressly sanctioned" by those agreements. 9 Nevertheless,
just two days after the President's decision, the European Union
requested dispute settlement consultations with the United
States, pursuant to the Dispute Settlement Understanding1O
("DSU") on the grounds that the measure violated those
agreements. 1l Other Members similarly affected by the
safeguard measure immediately followed suit. 1 2 As expected, the
consultations failed to reach a compromise.13 Accordingly,
exporting Members affected by the safeguard measure waged
their first attack by requesting the establishment of a dispute
panel pursuant to the DSU.14 In accordance with Articles 6 and
9 Press Release, supra note 5.
10 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
11 See Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/1 (Mar.
13, 2002) ("The EC considers that these US measures are in breach of the US obligations
under the provisions of GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on Safeguards .... ).
12 Request for Consultations by Japan, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures
on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS249/1 (Mar. 26, 2002); Request for
Consultations by Korea, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products, WT/DS251/1 (Mar. 26, 2002); Request for Consultations by China,
United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products,
WT/DS252/1 (Apr. 2, 2002); Request for Consultations by Switzerland, United States Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS253/1 (Apr. 8,
2002); Request for Consultations by Norway, United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS254/1 (Apr. 10, 2002); Request for
Consultations by New Zealand, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS258/1 (May 21, 2002); Request for Consultations by
Brazil, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel
Products, WT/DS259/1 (May 23, 2002).
13 See Panel Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of
2.6-2.12, WT/DS248/R, WTIDS249/R, WT/DS251/R,
Certain Steel Products,
WT/DS252/R, WT/DS253/R, WT/DS254/R, WT/DS258/R, WT/DS259/R (July 11, 2003)
[hereinafter WTO Steel Safeguard Panel Report] (demonstrating the inability of the
Members to mutually agree).
14 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United
States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products,
WT/DS248/12 (May 8, 2002); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Japan, United
States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS249/6
(May 24, 2002); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Korea, United States Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS251/7 (May
24, 2002); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China, United States - Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS252/5 (May 27, 2002);
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Switzerland, United States - Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS253/5 (June 4, 2002);
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Norway, United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS254/5 (June 4, 2002); Request for
the Establishment of a Panel by New Zealand, United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS258/9 (June 28, 2002); Request for
the Establishment of a Panel by Brazil, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on
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9.1 of that agreement, the DSB granted their requests and
established a single dispute panel to address the complaints of
each exporting Member. 15
Concurrently, affected exporting Members prepared for a
second attack from another front. Under Article 8.2 of the
Safeguards Agreement, an exporting country subject to an
improper safeguard measure may "suspend ... the application of
substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations" upon
proper notice submitted to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods
("Council"). Under Article 8.3, an improper safeguard measure is
defined as one that is taken without an absolute increase in
imports or otherwise inconsistent with the Safeguards
Agreement. Furthermore, the affected exporting Members must
suspend concessions "not later than 90 days after the [safeguard]
measure is applied."16 Accordingly, in May and June of 2002, the
EU, Japan, Switzerland, Norway, and the People's Republic of
China exercised the right embodied by Article 8.3, and notified,
as required under Article 8.2, the Council of their intent to
implement such rebalancing measures within the ninety-day
Simultaneously, Brazil, Korea, Australia, New
period. 17
Imports of Certain Steel Products,WT/DS259/10 (July 22, 2002).
15 On June 14, 2002, the DSB granted the request for the establishment of a dispute
panel submitted by the E.C., Japan and Korea. In doing so, the DSB established a single
panel under DSU Article 9.1. WTO Steel Safeguard Panel Report, supra note 13, T 2.7(b).
On June 24, 2002, the requests of China, Switzerland, and Norway were granted by the
DSB and the matter was referred to the panel already established for the E.C., Japan and
2.7(c). Subsequently, the importing countries entered into an agreement with
Korea. Id.
the U.S. to shorten the sixty-day period for consultations under DSU Article 4.7 and allow
New Zealand to pursue its claim with the established dispute panel. Id. 2.8. In turn, the
complainants agreed not to seek the appointment of panelists before July 15, 2002 and
agreed on longer time limits for submissions. Id. Similarly, Brazil and the U.S. concluded
an agreement that allowed the former's claims to be addressed by the established panel.
2.11. Furthermore, Canada, Taiwan, Cuba, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey and
Id.
Venezuela reserved their respective third party rights to participate in the proceedings.
Id. 2.15.
16 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 8.2 (stating time parameters for which
Members must suspend concessions).
17 European Communities, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the
Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of
Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the
Agreement on Safeguards, G/C/10 (May 15, 2002); European Communities: Supplement,
Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council
for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred
to in Paragraph2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, G/C/10/Suppl.1 (June 20,
2002); Japan, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards
to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other
Obligations Referred to in Paragraph2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards,
G/C/15 (May 21, 2002); Japan, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement
on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions
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Zealand, and Taiwan, while falling short of preparing for a fullscale assault, each issued a joint communication with the United
States that reserved their reciprocal rights under Article 8.2 and
extended the ninety-day time limit to implement rebalancing
measures to March 20, 2005.18 The proposed rebalancing
measures had the potential to inflict far-reaching economic harm
on the United States by exposing billions of dollars worth of its
key exports to tariffs purportedly equivalent to those of the U.S.
steel safeguard measure.
While considerable attention was given to the adjudication of
the safeguard measure's legality, the second battle entailed a
smaller yet more significant legal dispute that brought to light
the stark procedural defects of the Safeguards Agreement.
and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on
Safeguards, G/C/15/Suppl.1 (June 18, 2002); Norway, Immediate Notification under
Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed
Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph2 of Article 8
of the Agreement on Safeguards, G/C/16 (May 21, 2002); China, Immediate Notification
under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of
Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other ObligationsReferred to in Paragraph2 of
Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, C/C/17 (May 21, 2002); Switzerland, Immediate
Notification underArticle 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in
Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in
Paragraph2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, G/C/18 (May 22, 2002). The term
"rebalancing measures" connotes the suspension "of substantially equivalent concessions
or other obligations" as stated under Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement. Use of the
term "rebalancing measures" is not to suggest that the type of action contemplated under
Article 8.2 is distinct conceptually from the right "to suspend the application ... of
concessions or other obligations" under Article 22.2 of the DSU. The term does, however,
signify that suspension of concessions or other obligations carried out by an affected
exporting country is conducted pursuant to Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement to
offset the adverse effects of an allegedly inconsistent safeguard measure. The term
"retaliation" is generally used to refer to the suspension of concessions by a WTO Member
under Article 22.2 of the DSU.
18 Joint Communication from the United States and Korea, Immediate Notification
under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods
Concerning United States Action in Respect of Certain Steel Products, G/C/12 (May 16,
2002); Joint Communication from the United States and Brazil, Immediate Notification
under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods
Concerning United States Action in Respect of Certain Steel Products, G/C/li (May 16,
2002); Joint Communication from the United States and Australia, Immediate
Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in
Goods Concerning United States Action in Respect of Certain Steel Products, G/C/14 (May
17, 2002); Joint Communication from the United States and New Zealand, Immediate
Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in
Goods Concerning United States Action in Respect of Certain Steel Products, G/C/13 (May
17, 2002); Joint Communication from the United States and the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, Immediate Notification under Article
12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods Concerning United
States Action in Respect of Certain Steel Products, G/C/21 (June 14, 2002). The referenced
notifications illustrate the alternative approach taken by Brazil, Korea, Australia, New
Zealand, and Taiwan to second prong of attack.
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Central to the dispute was the right of a WTO Member to impose
rebalancing measures under Article 8. Specifically, the question
was whether an affected exporting country may reserve its right
to impose rebalancing measures beyond the ninety-day period set
forth in Article 8, pending resolution of the dispute by the DSB.
An analysis of this issue also leads to questions regarding the
relationship between the DSU and the Safeguards Agreement
and the right of affected exporting Members to unilaterally
determine under Article 8.3 that a safeguard measure is
improper - questions that remain central to the continued
validity of the Safeguards Agreement.
For better or worse, the second battle was never waged. The
dispute settlement process and the threat of retaliation
ultimately prompted the retreat of the United States. On July
11, 2003, the dispute panel established to address the claims
instituted by the steel exporting Members issued its final report,
which found the U.S. steel safeguard measure inconsistent with
GATT Article XIX:1(a) and Articles 2.1, 3.1, and 4.2 of the
Safeguards Agreement.1 9 On November 10, 2003, the WTO
20
Appellate Body affirmed the key findings of the dispute panel.
Much of the attention during the weeks following the Appellate
Body decision was focused on how the parties would react to the
dispute settlement finding rather than the legal questions
outlined above.
In the face of mounting threats of retaliatory tariffs from the
exporting Members and domestic pressure from U.S. steelconsuming manufacturers, the President lifted the steel
safeguard measure on December 4, 2003 - approximately 15
months prior to the earliest date of expiration set by the measure
- pursuant to his authority under Section 204 of the Trade Act.21
In the end, significant issues raised by the potential application
of rebalancing measures were effectively evaded by the parties
19 See generally WTO Steel Safeguard Panel Report, supra note 13, art. XI (noting the
conclusions developed by various Members).
20 Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products, art. XII, 1 513, WT/DS248/ABR, WT/DS249/AB/R,
WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003) (adopted Dec. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Certain Steel
Products].
21 Proclamation No. 7741, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,484 (Dec. 4, 2003) (demonstrating
the President's belief that safeguard measures were not effective in the current economic
circumstances).
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Critical analysis of those issues reveals the
and the WTO.
weaknesses of the WTO safeguard mechanism and the need to
fill the gaps left open by the negotiators of the Safeguards
Agreement.

I. THE GATT-WTO SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM
A. GATTArticle XIX
i. Framework of GATT Article XIX
Although a safeguard measure is not expressly defined by the
WTO agreements, the term is used in the context of GATT
Article XIX:1(a), which provides the fundamental basis for
imposing such a measure. 22 Under that article:
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of
the obligations incurred by a contracting party.., any
product is being imported into the territory of that
contracting party in such increased quantities and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers in that territory of like or directly
competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in
respect of such product ... to suspend the obligationin whole
or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.23
Accordingly, the remedy that Article XIX provides, i.e., the
24
suspension of obligations, is the so-called safeguard measure. It
allows a country to temporarily depart from an agreed-upon tariff
concession to protect a particular industry from an unexpected
and harmful surge of fairly imported products. 2 5 The protection
22 See KENNETH DAM, THE

GATT:

LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

99 (1970) (discussing the "escape clause" of GATT Article XIX).
23 GATT, supra note 7, art. XIX (emphasis added).
24 As stated by Kenneth Dam, safeguard measures "can thus be analogized more
directly to the doctrine of 'changed circumstances' in international law than can the
provisions of Article XXVII [Modification of Schedules]." DAM, supra note 22, at 99. GATT
Article XIX is often referred to as the "escape clause." Id.
25 See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM,
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW 898 (1998) (asserting that the escape clause in
GATT Article XIX was not completely original by citing similar clause of temporary effect
in earlier 1943 United States-Mexico Agreement); see also DAM, supra note 22, at 100
(explaining tariff schedules should be suspended as long as necessary to prevent or cure
injury).
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is generally understood to provide relief to the industry and allow
it to adjust to competition from abroad. 26
As a result of its unique features, a safeguard measure is
broader in scope than other trade remedies. First, the measure
applies on a non-discriminatory basis. 2 7 This concept, termed as
most-favored nation ("MFN") treatment under WTO law,
requires any safeguard measure to be applied to all exporting
Members without regard to the level of importation. 28 Second, a
single safeguard measure can sweep across numerous products
with a broad brush by applying to various classes or kinds of the
product at issue. 2 9 Third, because Article XIX:1(a) permits an
affected exporting Member to 'suspend [in whole or in part],'
'withdraw,' or 'modify"' the concession, a wide range of measures
may be taken once the conditions of that article are met. 30 As
stated by one scholar, such an authorization "is a testament to
the relative potential potency of Article XIX."31 In contrast to
safeguard measures, other trade remedies are typically targeted
toward select countries, individual firms, and narrower product
categories, and limited to the imposition of ad valorem duties. 3 2
26 See DAM, supra note 22, at 100 (noting that Article XIX provides balancing
mechanism for industries, allowing them to remain competitive in international
marketplace).
27 "Safeguard measures shall be applied to a product being imported irrespective of
its source." Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.2. Prior to the Safeguards
Agreement, however, it was not entirely clear that the language of GATT Article XIX
alone mandated the application of safeguard measures on a non-discriminatory basis.
DAM, supra note 22, at 104-05. Contracting parties reached an interpretive agreement at
the Havana ITO Conference following the conclusion of the GATT agreeing that safeguard
actions under Article XIX must be applied in a non-discriminatory way. Youngjin Jung &
Ellen Jooyeon Kang, Toward an Ideal WTO Safeguards Regime - Lessons from U.S. Steel, 38 INT'L LAW. 919, 934 (2004).
28 As an exception to this general rule, Article 9.1 of the Safeguards Agreement
allows Members imposing a safeguard measure to exempt, under certain conditions, a
developing country whose share of imports is de minimis. Jung & Kang, supra note 27, at
935. Also, the Agreement arguably allows safeguard-imposing Members to exempt FTA
and customs union partners. Id. at 935-36.
29 See MARC BACCHETTA & MARION JANSEN, SPECIAL STUDIES 7 - ADJUSTING TO
TRADE LIBERALIZATION, THE ROLE OF POLICY, INSTITUTIONS AND WTO DISCIPLINES 49
(2003), available at http://www.wto.org/englishi/res_efbooksp-e/special-study-7-e.pdf
(arguing the broad scope of Article XIX application under the definition of "domestic
industry"); see also DAM, supra note 22, at 100 (stating Article XIX can be applied to
entire industries).
30 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 901 (noting Article XIX:1(a)
authorization allows for broad range of measures to be taken including .the ability to
suspend, withdraw or modify concessions); see also DAM, supra note 22, at 105 (presenting
interpretive note under which suspensions, withdrawals or modifications under Article
XIX: 1(a) may not be applied in discriminatory fashion).
31 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 901.
32 The breadth of safeguard measures was much more extensive under GATT because
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With all of this in mind, the potential effects of a safeguard
measure on an affected exporting Member can be extraordinary.
It is important to emphasize from the outset that "a safeguard
remedy is not designed to redress unfair competition such as
dumping, illegal subsidization,
or intellectual property
infringements. Indeed, sometimes it is the failure to obtain relief
under one of the unfair import competition laws that prompts an
interested party to seek a safeguard remedy." 33 Thus, because a
trade violation is unnecessary to induce a safeguard action, it is
reasonable to perceive the remedy as the most protectionist one
available in the GATT-WTO system. 34 "After all, companies
producing imported products are behaving lawfully in accordance
with free market principles, and yet they are victimized by a
safeguard remedy." 3 5
Article XIX of GATT sets forth various procedural
requirements to further the policies of a rule-based trading
system. Under Article XIX:2, a safeguard-imposing Member
must give notice to affected exporting Members and an
opportunity to consult with the Member regarding the proposed
safeguard measure. The purpose of this notice and consultation
provision is to promote the guiding principle of cooperation that
was crucial to an international institution characterized by a
frail dispute resolution system. 3 6 Moreover, these requirements
promoted the multilateral trading system's goals of stability and
transparency. 3 7 Thus, Article XIX:2 implicitly affords affected
exporting Members time to readjust to the imposition of a
safeguard measure.
GATT Article XIX:3(a) embodies the notion of tariff bindings
that serves as a crucial pillar of the GATT-WTO system. Under
Article XIX failed to set forth specific rules in imposing a safeguard measure. "Under the
previous regime, if the prerequisites were established, governments were allowed to go
beyond simply slowing down the liberalization process or just reverting to the preliberalization situation." BACCHETTA & JANSEN, supranote 29, at 52.
33 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 897. "[A]nti-dumping actions are justified on
the ground that dumping is an 'unfair' practice that results in 'unfair' trade while
safeguards are justified for imports that are perfectly 'fair."' BACCHETTA & JANSEN, supra
note 29, at 55.
34 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 897 (stating that safeguard actions are
one of the most protectionist remedies allowed under the GATT-WTO system).
35 Id.
36 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 925 ("GATT Article XIX: 2 sets forth an
exception to the rule against taking an escape clause action without affording an
opportunity for prior consultations.").
37 See id. (describing how the procedural requirements "ensure transparency").
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that paragraph, a contracting party affected by a safeguard
measure is
[F]ree, not later than ninety days after such action is
taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from
the day on which written notice of such suspension is
received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to
the trade of the contracting party taking such action ...of

such substantially equivalent concessions or other
obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which
38
the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.

Stated differently, the affected contracting party is free to
retaliate in response to a safeguard measure by imposing
rebalancing measures. In practice, retaliation will not occur if
agreement can be reached on appropriate compensation. 3 9 By
allowing such measures, GATT Article XIX:3 protects the
agreement's principles of balanced concessions and tariff
bindings by discouraging use of safeguard measures and
promoting agreement on compensation. In other words, the
threat of retaliation is intended to deter the abuse of safeguard
measures under the guise of necessary relief.40 Despite the
provision's criticisms, it keeps the protectionist exception
embodied by Article XIX from swallowing the principle of
liberalized trade - the hallmark of the GATT-WTO system. 4 1
Indeed, the need for such a protective measure is particularly
acute in light of the extraordinary nature of safeguard measures.
ii. The Purpose Underlying GATT Article XIX
The remedy provided under Article XIX is not unique. 42 It "is
only one of five provisions in GATT that fall under the rubric of
38 GATT, supra note 7, art. XIX: 3(a) (emphasis added).
39 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 932 (explaining that the prospect of
retaliation promotes agreements on compensation); see also DAM, supra note 22, at 100
(stating that "the balance of concessions will be reestablished by the retaliatory
suspension of substantially equivalent concessions").
40 See BHALA &KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 932 (positing that one purpose of the
prospect of retaliation is that it deters the use of the escape clause).
41 See Report by the Chairman of the Council to the Fortieth Session of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, Safeguards, 8, MDF/4 (Nov. 23, 1984) [hereinafter 1984
Report of the Council Chairman] ("[T]he threat of retaliation could have a deterrent effect
against the application of safeguard actions [and] ... promote agreement on
compensation.").
42 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 897 ("While Article XIX of GATT is the
famous 'escape clause,' it should not be seen as wholly unique.").
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'safeguards."'4 3 Similarly, safeguard measures are not new to
international trade law. The first ever safeguard remedy was
contained in a 1943 trade agreement between the United States
and Mexico,44 and it consisted of much of the same language
currently reflected by GATT Article XIX:l(a).45 At that time,
inclusion of a safeguard measure was prompted by the fear in
Congress "of injury to domestic industry through concessions
granted in trade treaties."46 At the behest of the United States,
incorporation of a safeguard measure thereafter became the rule
rather than the exception.47
In light of the protectionist undertone of safeguard measures,
determining their object and purpose goes a long way towards
understanding their role within the GATT-WTO regime. Indeed,
the ability to temporarily renege on trade concessions is
seemingly inapposite to the goal of trade liberalization, begging
the question of why it was welcomed by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES. Given the scant history available regarding GATT
Article XIX, discerning the object and purpose of a safeguard
measure is also critical to understanding how it should be
applied today. Notwithstanding the long-standing existence of
Article XIX, the question of purpose remains unresolved.48
Nevertheless, several possible answers may shed some light.
First, Article XIX allows for the restoration of competitiveness:
By providing temporary protection, an Article XIX action
43 Id. For further detail on the other safeguards mentioned, refer to GATT, supra note
7, art. XII (Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments), art. XVIII (Governmental
Assistance to Economic Development), art. XXV (Joint Action by the Contracting Parties),
and art. XXVIII (Modification of Schedules).
44 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 898 (discussing the first escape clause in
international trade law); see also Y.S. Lee, Reflections on U.S. International Trade Law
and Practice - Compatibility with the WTO Rules and Call for Modification, 12
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J 31, 31 (2003) (tracing the origin of safeguard measures).
45 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 898 (quoting the escape clause in the 1943
United States-Mexico agreement).
46 Id. ("Escape clauses were the answer to congressional complaints: the '[1egislative
history of the 1945 congressional debate on the law that authorized the United States to
join GATT is replete with congressional complaints of injury to domestic industry through
concessions granted in trade treaties."' (quoting JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAW OF GATT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 553
(1969) [hereinafter JACKSON 11)).
47 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 898 ("In February 1947, President
Truman issued an Executive Order that required an escape clause to be included in every
United States trade agreement negotiated under the authority of the 1934 Act.").
48 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1118 (2d ed. 2001)

[hereinafter BHALA].
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allows an ailing industry to generate profits, and
reinvest these profits in factors of production ... and
thereby regain its competitive edge once protection is
removed.
The international trade community particularly consumers in different countries - benefit
49
because efficient competitors re-emerge.
A corollary to this argument is the possibility that such relief
provides for the orderly contraction of industries by allowing the
domestic industry "to adjust positively to import competition."5 0
In this context, the industry does not necessarily restore
competitiveness but seeks to lessen the "shock to factors of
production, most notably labor, by slowing the rate of contraction
in an import-sensitive industry."51 In essence, Article XIX is
considered a means of allocating the costs of market adjustment
between both the importing and exporting country. 52
Of course, political considerations played a key part in the
creation and adoption of Article XIX.53 In this sense, Article XIX
49 Id. at 1119.
50 Id. at 1120.
51 Id.
52 Id. Both of these possibilities are supported by the text of Article 5 of the
Safeguards Agreement, which states that safeguard measures shall be applied only to the
extent "necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment[,]" and
reinforced by the negotiating history of that agreement. Safeguards Agreement, supra
note 8, art. 7.1. Evidence of adjustment is necessary to justify extending a measure. Id.
art. 7.2. Progressive liberalization is intended to facilitate adjustment in cases of
measures originally imposed for longer than one year. Id. art. 7.4.
According to a WTO study conducted in 2003, however, the type of relief intended by
Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement is more accurately identified as the
restoration of competitiveness rather than the contraction of the affected industry:
[T]he kind of adjustment the drafters of the Agreement wished to facilitate is the
restructuring of industries hurt by import competition, rather than the reallocation of
resources released by the contraction of the import competing sectors. If a
government prevents or remedies an impairment in the position of import competing
industries, factors of production have no incentive to move and thus there is no
reallocation of resources from less efficient to more efficient activities.
BACCHETTA & JANSEN, supra note 29, at 50. The study argues that the prevailing intent
of restoration was confirmed by current WTO practice and reflected by the language used
by various Members in their safeguard legislation. Id. at 50-52. As illustrated by the
WTO study, criticism regarding these two possible purposes continue to linger. See id.
Of course, the ability of safeguard measures to truly restore the domestic industry's
competitiveness or contract the domestic industry has been extensively argued. For
instance, one commentator notes that a safeguard measure "relies on the questionable
assumption that governments can accurately identify and protect only those industries
that can become 'competitive"' and "even if governments were competent to identify
appropriate candidates for assistance and would properly exclude poor candidates,
protection is not necessarily the best way to provide such assistance." Alan 0. Sykes,
Protectionism as a "Safeguard":A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with
Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 264 (1991).
53 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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is a rent-seeking measure intended to appease protectionist
sentiment in exchange for their endorsement of GATT.54 While
this argument does not entirely reconcile Article XIX with the
WTO's goal of trade liberalization, it nevertheless promotes that
policy by serving as the least restrictive alternative when viewed
against the potential backlash of broad protectionist legislation
that may be adopted as a result of import surges. 5 5 Indeed, a
safeguard remedy "affects only a single industry in one case, and
perhaps just a few firms in that industry" but "[p]rotectionist
legislation can affect an entire sector of an economy, and have
reverberations throughout many other sectors." 56 Thus, absent
safeguard measures, "the pressures may be manifest in more 57
maybe far more - protectionist ways than [a safeguard] action."
Most importantly, Article XIX promotes the WTO's goal of
trade liberalization by encouraging "WTO Members (like the
GATT contracting party before them) to enter into a greater
number of tariff bindings than they otherwise would."58 In other
words, a safeguard measure serves as the eternal safe harbor
that WTO Members can rely upon in persuading themselves and
their domestic constituencies to accept certain concessions,
thereby relieving "a WTO Member of the fear that the
commitments into which they enter are irrevocable." 59 As stated
by an American delegate to the GATT negotiations, Article XIX:
[G]ive[s]
more flexibility to the commitments
Some provision of this kind seems
undertaken ....
necessary in order that countries will not find
themselves in such a rigid position that they could not
deal with situations of an emergency character.
54 DAM, supra note 22, at 106-07 ("One may conclude that the GATT escape clause is
a useful safety valve for protectionist pressures and does not undercut in any serious way
the advantages of the GATT tariff negotiating system.").
55 BHALA, supra note 48, at 1120-21 ("When a politically powerful industry in a
country complains of injury from a substantial increase in imports resulting from a tradeliberalizing agreement, an escape clause allows the government to alter unilaterally the
agreement with respect to the affected industry.").
56 Id. at 1121.
57 Id.

58 Id; see BACCHEITA & JANSEN, supra note 29, at 48 ("The general view is that
without the safety-valve provided by safeguards, governments might be reluctant to
liberalize in sectors where there is uncertainty concerning the adjustment process that
will follow the liberalization."); see also DAM, supra note 22, at 99 ("Its justification is that
the presence of [GATT Article XIX] encourages cautious countries to enter into a greater
number of tariff bindings than would otherwise be the case.").
59 BHALA, supra note 48, at 1122.
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Therefore, the Article . . . would provide for a
modification of commitments to meet such temporary
situation [sic].60
B. The WTO Safeguards Agreement
i. Background
Despite the existence of Article XIX, the remedy that it
provides was rarely invoked by WTO Members. 6 1 This
phenomenon is rather surprising in light of the article's apparent
effectiveness and flexibility in relieving Members of their
obligations.
The inability of Article XIX to live up to its
expectations is explained by several factors.
As an initial matter, some contracting parties simply found the
injury standard of Article XIX too high.62 No less significant was
the ability of Members to rely on other trade remedies as
effective, unilateral relief from threatening imports. 6 3 Also,
"recourse to Article XIX by most developing countries [were]
not... necessary because those countries have had few tariff
bindings and thus could raise their tariffs without violating their
60 BHALA, supra note 48, at 1121 (quoting U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/PV.7, at 3 (1946)); see
GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES 1988: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE WORK OF GATT 44 (1989)
[hereinafter GATT ACTIVITIES] ("The GATT's draftsmen, in the 1940s, realized that
governments would be unwilling to accept far-reaching obligations to reduce and stabilize
obstacles to trade unless they were allowed certain limited 'escapes' from its general
principles. Article XIX is one such 'escape clause .... "').
61 DAM, supra note 22, at 99 (explaining that since the escape clause has been used so
seldom, that it will be hard to argue getting rid of it); BHALA, supra note 48, at 1123
("Throughout the GATT era, Article XIX safeguards have not been the instrument of
choice by GATT members to impose import protection for various reasons." (quoting
JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, SAFEGUARDS, IN THE NEW TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 113-15
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ed., 1994)).
62 BHALA, supra note 48, at 1123 (quoting SCHOTT, supra note 61, at 113-15)
(claiming that one reason why article XIX safeguards have not been the instrument of
choice by GATT is that some countries find the serious-injury threshold to be too high);
see Cletus C. Coughlin, U.S. Trade-Remedy Laws: Do They Facilitate or Hinder Free
Trade?, 73 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 3, 12 (1991) ("The underlying criteria for a
successful petition.., have deterred the use of escape clause petitions and induced
industries to seek protection using other trade-remedy avenues.").
63 See BHALA, supra note 48, at 1123 ('Most major trading countries, however, have
been deterred from invoking Article XIX less by its requirements than by the availability
of less onerous and more flexible channels of protection ....
(quoting SCHOTT, supra note
61, at 113-15)); see also Coughlin, supra note 62, at 12 (positing that despite the
"requirement' that anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions can be invoked only to
counteract the specific unfair trade practices of dumping and export subsidies, industries
have increasingly resorted to these trade-remedy laws rather than use the escape clause
route").
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GATT obligations."6 4
Significantly, the implicit requirement to pay compensation to
affected exporting parties, and the unilateral right of rebalancing
absent compensation, served as a potent deterrent in invoking a
safeguard measure. 6 5 Because Article XIX's retaliation provision
is premised on the concept of balanced rights and obligations, the
article allows for compensation or rebalancing regardless of
material harm. 66 This obligation was absolute and applied
without regard to the adequacy of the safeguard measure at
issue. 6 7 Despite the requirement to consult with affecting
exporting nations, most contracting parties implemented
safeguards without consultation. 68 As such, the rights of
compensation and rebalancing were immediately triggered.
As stated by one scholar, however, "[w]hile the concept of a
balance of rights makes sense since no unfair trade practice is
alleged, it also made a country's use of the safeguard right very
difficult regardless of the state of extremis being faced by the
domestic industry seeking relief."69 Most Members were simply
64 BHALA, supra note 48, at 1123 (quoting SCHOTT, supra note 61, at 113-15).
65 See DAM, supra note 22, at 104 (stating that the right to retaliate may tend to
temper the protectionist fervor); see also TERENCE P. STEWART, 2 THE GATT URUGUAY
ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 1725 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993)
[hereinafter STEWART 1] (explaining why countries have often avoided the use of Article
XIX in search of bilateral solution); BHALA, supra note 48, at 1123 ('"Throughout the
GATT era, Article XIX safeguards have not been the instrument of choice by GATT
(quoting SCHOTT, supra note 61, at 113-15));
members to impose import protection ....
1984 Report of the Council Chairman, supranote 41, 8 ("There is a convergence of views
that contracting parties should retain the right given to them in the General Agreement
to re-establish the balance of rights and obligations under the Agreement .... ").
66 See GATT ACTIVITIES, supra note 60, at 44 ("Article XIX requires that the imports
should be causing actual damage to the domestic industry concerned or, at least,
threatening it. In these circumstances, the country affected may either increase tariffs or
introduce quantitative restrictions."); see also Terence P. Stewart et al., Essay:
Opportunities in the WTO for Increased Liberalization of Goods: Making Sure the Rules
Work for All and That Special Needs Are Addressed, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 652, 655-56
(2000) [hereinafter Stewart 2] ("Article XIX of GATT 1947 contains the concept of a
balance of rights and obligations after any action by a Member, meaning either
compensation to trading partners affected by a safeguard action or the potential for
retaliation against exports for the country taking action."); see also 1984 Report of the
8 (echoing the concept of "the balance of rights and
Council Chairman, supra note 41,
obligations"); see also GATT, supra note 7, art. XIX:3(a) (omitting any requirement of
material harm).
67 See GATT, supra note 7, art. XIX:3(a) (describing the obligations of each party in
full detail).
68 J. MICHAEL FINGER ET AL., ANTIDUMPING AS SAFEGUARD POLICY 3 (Dec. 2001)
[hereinafter FINGER 1] ("The GATT asked the country taking emergency action to consult
with exporting countries before, but allowed the action to come first in 'critical
circumstances.' In practice, the action has come first most of the time.").
69 Stewart 2, supra note 66, at 656.
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unwilling to pay compensation. 70 In addition, "as the general
average of tariffs has declined to a very low point ... it has

become increasingly harder for countries invoking safeguard
measures to be able to effectively compensate affected countries
by way of granting alternative concessions."71 Finally, the ability
of a contracting party resorting to a safeguard measure to pay

compensation was beleaguered by the very same burden that
prompted the adoption of Article XIX: the domestic industry. 7 2
Because compensation results in losses to certain domestic
constituencies and a corresponding backlash by legislators, the
ability to live up to such obligations became unrealistic. 7 3
Accordingly, as of 1987, offers of compensation declined
significantly and incidents of rebalancing correspondingly
increased.

74

Because of the inherent burdens that flourished in invoking
Article XIX, safeguard measures were eclipsed by more flexible
"grey-area" measures that were equally, if not more, effective in
protecting Members from unexpected surges in imports. 75 A form
70 See Jung & Kang, supra note 27, at 937-938 (discussing the impracticality and
costliness of compensation practice).
71 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 194 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter JACKSON 2].
72 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Next Move in Steel: Revocation or
Retaliation?, INT'L ECON. POL'Y BRIEFS No. PB03-10, Oct. 2003, at 6 (explaining that
countries in both the GATT and WTO disputes rarely use the compensation option
because of the possibility that it will create severe domestic political problems); see also
DAM, supra note 22, at 104, 369 (discussing the shortfalls of compensation and
retaliation).
73 See BHALA, supra note 48, at 1123 (quoting SCHOTT, supra note 61, at 113-15)
(commenting on countries' preference in invoking grey-area measures).
74 GATT Secretariat, Drafting History of Article XIX and its Place in GATT, art.
40.2(a), MTN.GNG/NG9/W/7 (Sept. 16, 1987) (explaining the rebalancing process); see
GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 486 (6th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE] ("With the declining incidence of
compensation, there had been an increasing incidence of invocation of Article XIX:3.").
75 See THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, H.R. Rep. No. 103-316, at 656, 956 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4040, 4105 [hereinafter SAA] (describing new sets of measures); see also BHALA, supra
note 48, at 1123 (quoting SCHOTT, supra note 61, at 113-15 (positing that most major
trading companies have backed away from invoking Article XIX because of the
availability of "less onerous and more flexible channels of protection including ... socalled 'grey-area measures"'); see also Stewart 2, supra note 66, at 656-57 ("When due to
political ramifications, the use of Article XIX is impractical, Contracting Parties have
resorted instead to the use of 'grey-area' measures"); see also FINGER 1, supra note 68, at
3-4 (stating that around the 1960's the formal use of Article XIX began to wane); see also
J. MICHAEL FINGER, GATT EXPERIENCE WITH SAFEGUARDS: MAKING ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL SENSE OF THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THE GATT ALLOWS TO RESTRICT IMPORTS 56 (1998) [hereinafter FINGER 2], available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbklwbrwps/
2000.html ("In GATT's first decade and a half the renegotiation and emergence action
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of managed trade, grey-area measures are negotiated on a
voluntary basis and outside the rubric of GATT rights and
obligations. 76 Many Members found such measures much easier
and less costly to negotiate and apply. 7 7 Indeed, grey-area
measures can be applied on a discriminatory basis and imposed
for longer periods than safeguard measures. 78 As a practical
matter, they also immunized affected exporting Members from
compensation and rebalancing.79
Voluntary export restraints ("VERs") were the most notorious
form of such measures. As stated by one observer, VERs "were
arguably the most pernicious form of protection in the 1970s and
1980s, as well as most other discriminatory import relief
actions." 8 0 As of 1991, only 24 Article XIX actions were in force,
while 284 grey-area agreements were known to exist.81 Although
grey-area measures provide benefits unavailable under a
safeguard measure, they are universally criticized as counter to
the ideals of a liberal, rule-based trading regime by, inter alia,
skirting established concessions, existing outside of the rubric of
GATT rules, undermining the GATT's policy of transparency, and
endorsing unfair bargaining tactics.8 2 Indeed, by the time of the
Uruguay Round, grey-area measures were universally viewed as
violative of GATT principles. 8 3
provisions served, for countries that had reduced and bound their tariffs through GATT,
as the procedures through which the countries would adjust their trade policy to
troublesome
imports."); see also GATT Secretariat,
"Grey-Area" Measures,
MTN.GNG/NG9W/6 (Sept. 16, 1987) (noting grey-area measures as an alternative
option).
76 See JACKSON 2, supra note 71, at 203-209 (describing grey-area measures).
77 BHALA, supra note 48, at 1123 ("Many countries find it easier and less costly to
target their trade restraints on specific exporters rather than all foreign suppliers."
(quoting SCHOTT, supra note 61, at 113-15)).
78 See Stewart 2, supra note 66, at 656 (stating that for many countries it became
imperative to find ways to get relief without having to pursue formal safeguard
procedures and remedies, which thus resulted in countries turning increasingly to use of
"grey-area" measures).
79 Id. ("One of the other perceived 'advantages' of grey-area measures is the lack of
compensation or retaliation with grey-area measures.").
80 SCHOTT, supranote 61, at 113-15.
81 Stewart 2, supra note 66, at 657.
82 See JACKSON 2, supra note 71, at 203-204 (describing that grey-area measures
"have been extremely troublesome and have been the subject of considerable criticism
from GATT bodies as well as from economists and government officials"); see also
STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1727 (1993) (explaining why grey-area measures have been
criticized); see also GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 74, 493-95 (stating
that 'voluntary restraint agreements were often forced upon the weaker members"').
83 STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1756-57; see SAA, supra note 75, at 286 (describing
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act); Finger 2, supra note 75, at 6 ('The Uruguay Round
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The proliferation of grey-area measures arguably supports the
conclusion that Article XIX failed to fulfill its intended
purposes.8 4 This observation is reinforced by the genesis of the
Safeguards Agreement during the Uruguay Round.8 5 The
agreement sets forth specific rules for the application of a
safeguard measure pursuant to GATT Article XIX. While GATT
Article XIX imposed the general framework for a safeguard
measure, the Safeguards Agreement sets forth more detailed
conditions in which such a measure may be imposed.8 6 And while
its creation was an implicit recognition that a safeguard measure
is a legitimate and well-accepted tool in the pursuit of trade
liberalization, it represented the deficiencies of GATT Article
XIX. As such, the drafters of the Safeguards Agreement sought
to improve and strengthen the remedy available under that
article and thereby encourage the use of relief available under,
rather than peripheral to, the GATT system. 8 7
ii. The Negotiating History of the Safeguards Agreement
During the Uruguay Round, the need to reform the safeguards
system was unanimously recognized by the entire spectrum of
negotiating parties.8 8 Developed countries led the effort,
recognizing the ability of an effective safeguard mechanism to
reduce trade barriers and minimize international trade
conflicts.8 9 Similarly, developing countries acknowledged the
need for a modified safeguards regime that set out clear and
precise rules. 9 0 To that end, all parties were unanimous in the
agreements changed things.").
84 GATT Secretariat, Meeting of 25 and 27 May 1987,
7, MTN.GNG/NG9/2 (June
25, 1987) ("An upsurge of 'grey-area' measures from 1975 to the present had robbed
Article XIX of its meaning and value.").
85 See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11 (describing the prohibition and
elimination of certain measures under the Safeguards Agreement).
86 See id. art. 1 ("[The Safeguards Agreement] establishes rules for the application of
safeguard measures which shall be understood to mean those measures provided for in
Article XIX of GATT 1994.").
87 See id. pmbl. (stating the need to improve and strengthen the international trading
system based on GATT); see also SAA, supra note 75, at 286 (describing the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, and why it was created).
88 See STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1745 ("GATT members have for many years
sought to clarify and strengthen provisions of Article XIX.").
89 See id. ("[T]he effort toward trade liberalization would be greatly enhanced if there
were a good safeguard system in place because it would reduce trade barriers and manage
many international trade conflicts.").
90 Id. (noting that developing countries felt that clear and modified GATT safeguards
were needed for full trade liberalization to occur).
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campaign to curb the unilateral right to impose safeguards and
rebalancing measures.
Beyond simply strengthening safeguard measures, the
Safeguards Agreement is the product of diverse aims and
interests, the identification of which is critical to understanding
both the Agreement and Article XIX. The primary objective of
developing countries was to establish the mandatory application
of the MFN principle to safeguard measures. 9 1 "In their view,
they did not have the political or economic leverage, such as a
credible threat of retaliation, to deter arbitrary action against
them." 92 By sanctioning selectivity, the developing countries
argued that their lack of bargaining power would allow developed
countries to target their exports. 93 This result, according to the
developing countries, went against the grain of fair trade by
allowing harmed nations to target the most efficient exporters. 9 4
The EC, on the other hand, was a strong supporter of allowing
discriminatory safeguard measures. 95 It perceived such an
approach as a valid trade-off with grey-area measures. 96 The
91 GATT Secretariat, Work Already Undertaken in the GATT on Safeguards,
B.17,
C.22, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/1 (Apr. 7, 1987) (explaining that countries were much more
likely to move toward trade liberalization if "there were adequate provisions for safeguard
action"); see, e.g., Communication from Brazil,
7, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/5 (July 2, 1987)
(stating that Article XIX's scope should be expanded to give legal coverage to future
safeguard actions in selective form of VERs or OMAs and move to ban bilateral and
selective actions in favor of precise and lucid rules); see also STEWART 1, supra note 65, at
1762 (commenting that the main goal of developing countries was to have a safeguard
system that prohibited action that could threaten their "trade, financial, and development
needs").
92 STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1762.
93 See id. (noting the concern of developing countries that by allowing selective
actions it would send message that similar actions in future were condoned and thus
creating "a step backward for the trading system").
94 See id. at 1768 (explaining that developing countries feel they need to be protected
from border measures that would hurt their exports because of their weak bargaining
power).
95 Id. at 1748 (stating that a part of the EC's effort to see the development of a
selective safeguard system can be attributed to them suffering from recession and them
being aware that there would be pressure to resort to import restrictive measures).
96 See id. (describing the EC's position); see also id. at 1764 (claiming that the U.S.
position on selectivity was not as uncompromising); see also id. at 1764-65 (listing as its
primary objectives: '1) to improve rules and procedures covering safeguard measures; 2)
to ensure that safeguard measures are transparent, temporary, degressive, and subject to
review and termination when no longer necessary; and 3) to require prior notification and
monitoring of import relief actions."' (quoting Oversight of 1988 Trade Act: 1990: Hearings
Before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Finance Comm., 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1990) (testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Representative))); see
also id. at 1765 (positing that the U.S. believed that incentives were necessary to
encourage contracting parties to safeguard themselves through GATT rules rather than
outside of them).
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negotiations naturally turned into a delicate balancing act by
forcing negotiating parties to incorporate features that
encouraged the use of safeguard measures without endorsing the
principles that made grey-area measures problematic - the very
reasons for negotiating a new agreement. 9 7
Because the issues of compensation and retaliation were
critical barriers to the effectiveness of GATT Article XIX, they
were unsurprisingly a pressing topic of debate during
negotiations of the Safeguards Agreement. As stated by one
observer:
One of the key objectives of the Safeguards Agreement
negotiated during the Uruguay Round was to "reestablish multilateral control over safeguards" by
striking a balanced set of disciplines both on
safeguards measures and on retaliation imposed in
response to safeguard measures. One of the ways the
Uruguay Round negotiators accomplished this goal
was to limit the right of retaliation. 98
While most negotiating parties advocated the curtailment of
compensation and retaliation rights, other parties acknowledged
such rights as useful deterrents against unjustified safeguard
measures. 99 Yet, parties understood that the threat of unilateral
retaliation drove governments towards grey-area measures.1 0 0
Thus, parties realized that limitations on the right of
compensation and retaliation were required in order to increase
the effectiveness of safeguard measures.
Nevertheless,
97 GATT Secretariat, Synopsis of Proposals, 3, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/21 (Oct. 31, 1998)
('The Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Safeguards is faced with two fundamental,
somewhat contradictory challenges: (i) to provide clearly-elaborated rules and disciplines
governing safeguards measures, while (ii) making the GATT safeguard provision
sufficiently dynamic and credible so that nations will act under it, rather than outside
it.").
98 ALA WM. WOLFF & ROBERT E. LIGHTHIZER, AN ADVERSE WTO DECISION IN THE
STEEL SAFEGUARD CASE WOULD NOT AUTHORIZE IMMEDIATE RETALIATION OR
TERMINATION OF THE SAFEGUARD RELIEF 5 (2003) (citing Safeguards Agreement, supra
note 8, pmbl.; STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1798).

99 See, e.g., GATT Secretariat, Work Already Undertaken in the GATT on Safeguards,
25, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/1 (Apr. 7, 1987) (explaining that the threat of retaliation could
deter the application of safeguard actions); see also STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1773
(noting that some participants in the Uruguay Round negotiations have insisted that
compensation and retaliation rights should be maintained).
100 SAA, supra note 75, at 656 (describing some provisions of the Uruguay Round
Agreement); see STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1725 (claiming that "due to political
ramifications, the use of article XIX is impracticable, contracting parties have resorted
instead to the use of 'grey-area' measures").
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disagreement remained on the method of accomplishing that
task.
Developing countries were acutely aware of the extensive
damage that could be inflicted on their economy as a result of a
safeguard measure. 10 1 As a result, they naturally "viewed
2
compensation as an obligation of developed countries."O
Developed countries, as expected, were adverse to the idea of
mandatory compensation. 10 3 "The United States, for example,
argued that the principle of compensation conflicted with the
temporary nature of the safeguard action."104 Japan, however,
favored the unlimited right of compensation and retaliation as it
existed under GATT Article XIX because, in its view, such
obligations "had a positive effect on the decision-making process
of nations considering safeguard actions."105 In other words,
compensation and retaliation served as a check on the use (or
abuse) of safeguards, ensuring that the remedy was relied upon
only in exceptional and legitimate circumstances. Resolution of
the compensation and retaliation issues required a balance
between these diverging interests. Eventually, discussion on this
issue became inextricably intertwined with the issue of
selectivity, further jeopardizing the likelihood of agreement.
While subsidiary to the issues of selectivity and retaliation, the
issues of notification and consultation also attracted substantial
attention by the negotiating parties given the extreme nature of
safeguard remedies.106 The need to concentrate on such issues
seems obvious, as they contribute to the wider goals of stability,
101 See STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1749 ("[S]afeguard actions could not be taken
unless such measures were in conjunction with structural measures to ensure that the
injured industry retrenched.").
102 Id.
103 Id. (stating that many of these developed countries "did not want compensation as
a requirement").
104 Id.

105 Id. at 1773-74.
106 See Communication from Australia, Hong Kong, Korea, New Zealand and
Singapore, Elements of an Agreement on Safeguards, 3(a), MTN.GNGNG9IW/4 (May
25, 1987) (determining as one of the primary elements of safeguards measures specific
notification procedures such as descriptions of products subject to the measure, the
reasons for the measure and any steps taken or proposed to be taken to remedy need for
measure); see also GATT Secretariat, Work Already Undertaken in the GATT on
Safeguards, 18, MTN.GNC/NG9/W/1 (Apr. 7, 1987) (suggesting that current notification
and consultation requirements in Article XIX may need to be strengthened as to "the
contents of the notification, the time element for consultation ... as well as the conditions
that ha[ve] to be fulfilled in 'critical circumstances"').
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cooperation and transparency, all of which are indispensable to
the successful operation of the multilateral trading system. In
general, all of the participants agreed on the need for greater
transparency in invoking safeguard actions. 10 7 However, while
developed countries argued that consultation and notification
prior to imposing safeguard measures should not be required
because use of those measures is a sovereign right, developing
countries favored the retention and enhancement of such
obligations as they existed under GATT Article XIX.108
Ultimately, "most delegations want[ed] to see the final safeguard
agreement contain stricter notification and consultation
requirements."10 9
Even more far-reaching was the support that was garnered for
"the establishment of a mechanism for multilateral surveillance
that would provide for regular monitoring of safeguard
actions." 1 10 As a result, a Safeguard Committee was created to
formally monitor actions taken under GATT Article XIX.111
Nevertheless, other countries pressed for the formation of
another permanent body that would have "establish[ed] rules for
consultation, outline[d] standards for the determination of injury,
and set guidelines for the application of differentiated treatment
11 2
for developing countries."'
iii. The Provisions of the Safeguards Agreement
In creating a single agreement encompassing safeguard
measures, the drafters codified rules and procedures that further
107 See STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1781, 1786 (explaining that establishing "a
safeguards committee" to oversee greater transparency among contracting parties to
ensure notification and consultation would serve to balance the interests of developing
and developed countries).
108 Id. at 1751 (describing why the issue of multilateral notification and consultation
prior to the initiation of safeguard action was had some disagreement).
109 Id. at 1781.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1798 (furthering that the committee would oversee that the parties not only
consult with one another but also provide "all relevant information including the precise
description of the product in question, the proposed measure and the reason for
measure").
112 Id. at 1751; see GATT Secretariat, Work Already Undertaken in the GATT on
Safeguards, 9, MTN.GNG/NG9W/1 (Apr. 7, 1987) (describing two different approaches
that have been made with respect to the various conditions that could be attached to the
application of Article XIX measures); Japan, Proposal on Safeguards,
9(2),
MTN.GNG/NG9/W/11 (Oct. 13, 1987) (positing that a subcommittee under the Safeguard
Committee should be establish which would be in charge of dispute settlement).
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discipline the unilateral right to impose safeguard measures and
secure the efficacy that was so elusive under Article XIX. To that
end, the Safeguards Agreement contains provisions that clarify
and reinforce the principles embodied by that article. As stated
by the WTO itself, the Safeguards Agreement "reduces the size of
the loophole to allow only for measures that are really designed
to facilitate adjustment." 1 13
The most significant achievement of the Safeguards Agreement
is the requirement that safeguard measures be applied on an
MFN basis.114 Another notable but expected accomplishment is
the explicit prohibition of grey-area measures. 1 15 In addition,
under the Safeguards Agreement, a WTO Member must conduct
a thorough and fair investigation of the imported product prior to
applying a safeguard measure, 1 16 and limit the duration of the
safeguard measure to four years absent further investigation by
the appropriate domestic authority.117 The Safeguards
Agreement also provides more detailed notification and
consultation requirements in the event that a Member seeks to
impose a safeguard measure. 1 18
While the language and negotiating history of the Safeguards
Agreement demonstrates that the provisions were drafted with
an eye toward making Article XIX an attractive alternative for
domestic relief, the actual success of the drafters in doing so
remains to be seen. Although the figures undoubtedly reveal the
success of the Safeguards Agreement in achieving its primary
goal of encouraging Members to resort to that article for relief,119
113 BACCHETTA & JANSEN, supra note 29, at 52.
114 See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2 (stating the ways in which
safeguard measures could be applied); see also STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1725 ("[A]
contracting party who invokes Article XIX must comply with the most-favored nation
(MFN) obligation of Article I, which prohibits discrimination between different sources of
imports."); see also BHALA, supra note 48, at 1124 ("[T]he Agreement reaffirms that
safeguard actions must be applied against imports from all sources; that is, on a most
favoured-nation (MFN) basis." (quoting SCHOTT, supra note 61, at 113-15)).
115 See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11 (listing those measures which
were eliminated and now prohibited).
116 Id. art. 3 (describing the process of investigation that must be conducted before
the application of safeguard measures).
117 Id. art. 7 ("A Member shall apply safeguard measures only for such period of time
as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and'to facilitate adjustment. The
period shall not exceed four years .... ").
118 Id. art. 12 (explaining the process that Members have to following as far as
notification and consultation is concerned, should one of them decide to impose safeguard
measures).
119 The number of safeguard notifications and measures increased substantially since
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the experience of WTO safeguards under that agreement
warrants a mixed reaction, as demonstrated by various
safeguard disputes discussed in this article
In particular, it remains uncertain whether the new retaliation
and compensation provisions, which are discussed in further
detail below, achieved the balance that was sought between
limiting the right of rebalancing and serving as a check on the
use of safeguards. Equally ambivalent is whether the ends
sought by the drafters were negated by procedural deficiencies
that surfaced from the compensation and retaliation provisions.
As anything in the law, the devil is in the details and the
Safeguards Agreement is no exception. As demonstrated below,
the small yet significant oversights of the drafters leave the right
to impose rebalancing measures in a precarious state.
II. THE PROVISIONAL RELIEF MECHANISM OF THE SAFEGUARDS
SYSTEM

A. GATT Article XIX'3(a), Article 8 of the SafeguardsAgreement,
and the Right of Retaliation
Article 8 of the Safeguards Agreement sets forth the
procedural requirements for implementing a safeguard measure
once the substantive prerequisites of that agreement and GATT
Article XIX are satisfied. Under Article 8.1:
A Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure...
shall endeavour to maintain
a substantially
equivalent level of concessions and other obligation to
that existing under GATT 1994 between it and the
exporting Members which would be affected by such a
measure, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 3 of Article 12. To achieve this objective,
the Members concerned may agree on any adequate
means of trade compensation for the adverse effects of

the Safeguards Agreement went into effect. See Jung and Kang, supra note 27, at 931.
While safeguard notifications and measures have somewhat declined in recent years, they
increased exponentially between 1995 and 2002. For an example, check safeguard
statistics available on the WTO website available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
safeg-e/safeg-e.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). Those statistics indicate that Members
relied more on safeguard measures as opposed to grey-area measures.
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12 0
the measure on their trade.

As reiterated by a WTO dispute panel, "Article 8.1 imposes an
obligation on Members to 'endeavour to maintain' equivalent
concessions with affected exporting Members."12 1 Thus, the
animating principle of Article 8 is the balance of rights and
obligations. 122
In pursuit of this objective, GATT Article XIX:3(a) and Article
8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement allow a WTO Member affected
by a safeguard measure to implement rebalancing measures to
offset the adverse economic effects of a safeguard measure. In
effect, these provisions provide the basis for retaliation that is
unique in the context of safeguards. Under Article 8.2 of the
Safeguards Agreement, if consultations regarding the proposed
safeguard measure do not lead to agreement within thirty days:
[T]he affected exporting Members shall be free, not
later than 90 days after the measure is applied, to
suspend, upon the expiration of 30 days from the day
on which written notice of such suspension is received
by the Council for Trade in Goods, the application of
other
or
concessions
equivalent
substantially
obligations under GATT 1994, to the trade of the
Member applying the safeguard measure, the
suspension of which the Council for Trade in Goods
does not disapprove.123
The procedures set forth under that article are a mirror image of
those contained in GATT Article XIX:3(a). GATT-WTO practice
illustrates that Members have frequently resorted to bilateral
agreements to extend the ninety-day period.124
The purpose of Article 8.2's consultation and notification
requirements is to promote the basic GATT-WTO policies of

120 See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 8.1.
121 Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, 145, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000)
(hereinafter U.S. - Wheat Gluten].
122 See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 8.1 ("A member proposing to apply a
safeguard measure or seeking an extension of a safeguard measure shall endeavor to
maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations .....
123 See id. art. 8.2.
124 See id. art. 12.3 ("A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure
shall provide adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those Members having a
substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned .... ").
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stability, transparency, and cooperation. 1 25 In particular, the
time limitations set forth in that article are tailored toward
alleviating harm arising from a sudden imposition of a
rebalancing measure.
The right of rebalancing permitted under Article 8 is also
subject to certain substantive requirements. Under Article 8.3,
the right to rebalance:
[S]hall not be exercised for the first three years that a
safeguard measure is in effect, provided that the
safeguard measure has been taken as a result of an
absolute increase in imports and that such a measure
conforms to the provisions of this Agreement.126
By developing substantive legal criteria for rebalancing, the
negotiating parties sought to discourage the use of inconsistent
safeguard measures while aiming to assuage the fears of
unregulated rebalancing. While the rebalancing right in Article
8.2 deters the application of inconsistent safeguard measures, the
substantive requirements of Article 8.3 curtail the unlimited
right to rebalance.1 27 Hence, Article 8.3 represents the balance
negotiating parties struck between the need for a strengthened
safeguard mechanism and the continued right of affected
exporting Members to rebalance against illegal safeguard
measures.12 8 Thus, Article 8.3 is central to a safeguard measure's
renewed viability. 129
Although the negotiating parties preserved the rebalancing
right, the procedural deficiencies of Article 8 raise questions
regarding the ability of Members to exercise that right. First,
Article 8 fails to establish whether a Member's Article 8.3
determination-i.e., whether the safeguard measure was imposed
as a result of an absolute increase in imports or is otherwise
inconsistent with the Safeguards Agreement-is unilateral.
Second, according to some commentators, Article 8 seemingly
125 See STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1786, 1798 (speaking about how the notification
and consultation requirements of Article XIX promote greater transparency).
126 See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 8.3.
127 See STEWART 1, supra note 65, at 1786 ("A contracting party deciding to take a
safeguard measure would be required to give parties potentially affected by the measure
an opportunity for prior consultations.").
128 See id. at 1745, 1773-74, 1786, 1798 (describing the balance in further detail).
129 Id. at 1773 (giving reasons why the safeguard measure gained momentum
towards renewed viability).
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cuts off an affected exporting Member's right to rebalance if it
first relies upon the DSU to challenge the underlying legality of a
safeguard measure. Finally, the language of Article 8.2 prohibits
the application of rebalancing measures "not later than 90 days
after the [safeguard] measure is applied," serving as an
Close
impediment to a Member's right to rebalance.1 30
examination of these issues reveals weaknesses of the
rebalancing mechanism that contribute to the chorus for reform
of the Safeguards Agreement.
B. Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick: The UnilateralRight of
Retaliation
At initial glance, both DSU Article 23 and Article 14 of the
Safeguards Agreement seem to require an affected exporting
This
Member to resort to the DSU prior to rebalancing.
proposition is reinforced by the absence of Article 8 of the
Safeguards Agreement from Article 1.2 of the DSU, which
exhaustively lists provisions in certain agreements that conflict
with, but prevail over, those of the DSU. 131
None of those articles, however, should be interpreted to
require an affected exporting Member to resort to the DSU before
applying rebalancing measures pursuant to Article 8. Stated
differently, based on the language of Article 8.3, it appears that
an affected exporting Member may unilaterally impose
rebalancing measures by independently determining that a
safeguard measure is not based on an absolute increase in
imports or is otherwise inconsistent with the Safeguards
Agreement. 132
130 DSU, supra note 10, art. 8.2.
131 Several of the agreements identified in DSU Article 1.2 contain qualifying
language stating that the provisions of the DSU apply "subject to[,]" implicitly
acknowledging that certain provisions of those agreements supersede those of the DSU.
No such language exists in the Safeguards Agreement.
132 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (stating that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties will be applied in analyzing the issues contained in
this article, which WTO adjudicative bodies frequently resort to as the authoritative
source of law and adhere to its interpretive rules). See generally DSU, supra note 10, art.
3.2 ("The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system."); Appellate Body Report, United
States - CountervailingDuties on Certain Corrosion-ResistantCarbon Steel Flat Products
61-62, WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002) (emphasizing that according to
from Germany,
WTO case law, the principles codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on
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i. The WTO Agreement and GATT: The Relationship between
Safeguards and Dispute Settlement
The WTO Agreement makes a distinction between the DSU
and the Safeguards Agreement, but declares both as integral
instruments of the WTO regime.1 3 3 Moreover, DSU Article 3.5
contemplates the use of consultation and remedial mechanisms
available in other WTO agreements by stating that "[a]ll
solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements . . . shall
be consistent with those agreements and shall not nullify or
impair benefits accruing to any Member under those
agreements ...."134 Thus, full legal effect should be accorded to
both the DSU and Article 8 of the Safeguards Agreement.
The mere existence of GATT Article XIX:3(a), which explicitly
provides a rebalancing mechanism to affected exporting
Members, is equally relevant to the independently operational
nature of Article 8. Unlike the DSU, the language of GATT
Articles XXII and XXIII - GATT's dispute settlement provisions
- do not explicitly state that such provisions are the exclusive
means of settling GATT disputes.
Because GATT Article
XIX:3(a) makes no mention of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII,
rebalancing was never intended to be executed according to those
provisions. And according to the language of GATT Articles XXII
and XXIII, reliance on GATT's dispute settlement mechanism is
discretionary. Because Article 8 virtually mirrors the language
contained in GATT Article XIX:3(a) and makes no mention of the
DSU, that intent should persist today.135 Although the DSU is
the Law of Treaties are the types of rules that should be used in the settlement of issues
arising in WTO dispute settlement).
133 See DSU, supra note 10, art. 3.5 (describing the distinction between the DSU and
Safeguards Agreement).
134 Id. (emphasis added).
135 Under Article 31.2(a) of the VCLT, the DSU must be read in the context of the
Safeguards Agreement because the latter agreement relates to the former agreement and
the latter agreement is one that "was made between all the parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty." VCLT, supra note 132, art. 31.2(a); see Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, TT 6.72-6.82, WT[DS285/R
(2004). This principle is buttressed by the DSU itself, which governs any dispute "brought
pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions" of the Safeguards
Agreement. DSU, supra note 10, art. 1.1. However, that is not to say that application of
the DSU may be inconsistent with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. See DSU,
supra note 10, art. 3.5 ("All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation
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now the exclusive means to redress violations of WTO rules, the
operation of rebalancing measures under GATT should be
relevant to the independent validity and operation of Article 8.
ii. GATT-WTO Practice
The use of rebalancing measures outside the purview of the
DSU is further supported by GATT-WTO practice. Under GATT,
affected exporting parties did not invoke rebalancing measures in
the context of GATT Articles XXII or XXIII.136 To be sure, GATT
Articles XXII and XXIII were implicated in several safeguard
disputes, but solely to address the legality of the underlying
safeguard measure 137 or the appropriateness of the rebalancing
measures. 13 8 Despite this known practice, negotiating parties
enacted Article 8 without any reference to dispute settlement
provisions, indicative of their implicit approval of rebalancing
outside the context of the DSU.
Hence, the practice of unilateral rebalancing has extended to
the WTO. In each instance that rebalancing measures were
applied, affected exporting Members did so without resort to the
DSU.139 For instance, in United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European
Communities ("U.S. - Wheat Gluten"), the European Community
unilaterally imposed rebalancing measures in response to the
United States' allegedly inconsistent safeguard measure without resort to the DSU. Rather than taking issue with the
and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements ... shall be consistent with
those agreements ....").
136 See, e.g., Notification of Compensatory Measures by the European Economic
Community, Article XIX - Action by Canada: Footwear, LU5351/Add.22 (Mar. 1, 1985);
Notice of Suspension of Concessions by the European Communities, Article XIX- Action
by Australia: Certain Footwear, U4099/Add.25 (Feb. 5, 1982); Notice of Suspension of
Concession by the European Communities, Article XIX - Action by Australia: Passenger
Motor Vehicles, L/4526/Add.23 (Feb. 5, 1982); United States, United States - Temporary
Restrictions on Imports of Certain Livestock Items from Canada,L/4118 (Nov. 25, 1974).
137 See, e.g., Report of the Intersessional Working Party on the Complaint of
Czechoslovakia Concerningthe Withdrawalby the United States of a Concession under the
terms of Article XIX, GATT/CP/106 (Mar. 27. 1951) (providing the complaint by
Czechoslovakia concerning the United States' withdrawal of concessions under the terms
of Article XIX); Report of the Panel, Norway - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile
Products, L/4959 - 27S/119 (Mar. 24, 1980) (discussing in full detail, Norway's restrictions
on imports of certain textile products).
138 See Minutes of Council Meeting, at 4, CJM/186 (Apr. 19, 1985) (regarding the
Canada-Article XIXAction on Imports of Footwear discussion).
139 See supra note 135 for a list of retaliation requests in which the DSU was not
invoked.
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European Community's failure to follow DSU procedures, the
United States challenged the European Community's failure to
place the measure on the agenda of the Council and consult with
the United States on the appropriate level of rebalancing.i40
Ultimately, resolution of that issue was avoided because the U.S.
safeguard measure expired, forcing the European Community to
lift its rebalancing measures.
Poland followed the same approach in Slovakia - Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Sugar.141 In that case, however, Slovakia
directly objected to the unilateral application of Poland's
rebalancing measures. Nevertheless, Poland had:
[S]erious doubts as to whether the DSU mechanism
should be invoked in the context of [Article 8.3] since
the objective to be sought by the Member concerned
under this provision differed from the one referred to
in Article 23 of the DSU. Once more, if a Member
considering the application of suspension followed the
procedure proposed by Slovakia and waited for the
DSB ruling on the conformity of this safeguard
measure with the Agreement, that would eventually
result in granting the importing Member a bonus in
case of the DSB's declaration of non-conformity of the
measure. So, even though that approach would be in
full accord with the DSB, it would, nevertheless,
effectively deprive the affected Member, in the light of
paragraph 2 - imposed time limit, of its right to
suspend concessions even in the situation where the
safeguard measure was finally declared by the DSB as
non-conforming to the provisions of the Agreement. 142
140 Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities - TariffRate Quota on Corn Gluten Feed from the United States, WT/DS223/1 (Jan. 30, 2001)
(' The EC... never placed the measure on the agenda of the Council for Trade in Goods.
In addition, the EC at no point consulted with the United States on how measures
imposed by the EC might meet the requirement to maintain substantially equivalent
levels of concessions and other obligations to that existing under the GATT 1994.").
141 See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Slovakia - Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Sugar, WT/DS235/2 (Jan. 16, 2002) (outlining the approach used for the
safeguard measure in imports of sugar in Slovakia); see also Communication from the
European Commission, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on
Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and
Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards,
G/L/251 (Aug. 3, 1998) (describing the proposed suspension of concessions and other
obligations).
142 Draft Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 29 October 2001,
79, G/SGfM/18
(Feb. 11, 2002).
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Resolution of that issue was avoided due to a mutual agreement
regarding the underlying safeguard measure. 1 43 Likewise, in
United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products, affected exporting Members notified the
Council of their intent to apply rebalancing measure and did so
without resort to the DSU.144 The issue of unilateral application,
although lingering, was never formally raised in that dispute.
iii. The Impracticability and Unfairness of Relying on the DSU
No less significant, forcing a Member to rely on the DSU as a
prerequisite to rebalancing is simply impracticable. As stated
above, a safeguard action is a temporary remedy that may be
imposed for up to four years.145 Under the DSU, however, the
ability of an aggrieved Member to retaliate cannot be achieved
for a minimum of approximately two years.146 Therefore, in many
cases, resort to the dispute settlement mechanism fails to timely
redress the harms that result from unlawful safeguard measures.
By the time an affected exporting Member is accorded the right
to retaliate under the DSU, the safeguard measure is likely to
have been lifted or expired, as demonstrated in both U.S. Wheat Gluten and U.S. - Steel Safeguards. On the other hand,
alternative trade remedies are imposed for an indefinite time
period and, thus, are more adequately redressable under normal
DSU procedures.147 Timing considerations were particularly
acute under GATT because Article XXIII of that agreement did
not set forth defined time limits for the adjudication of disputes,
allowing them to last indefinitely.148 Indeed, some GATT
143 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Slovakia - Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Sugar, WT/DS235/2 (Jan. 16, 2002) (explaining the terms of the agreement
between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Poland).
144 See Certain Steel Products, supra note 20, art. XII, 513. Note that resort to the
DSU concerned the underlying decision to apply the U.S. safeguard measures themselves,
and not the rebalancing measures proposed by the affected exporting Members.
145 This time period may extend up to another four years upon a finding by the
appropriate domestic authorities that the measure is, inter alia, "necessary to prevent or
remedy serious injury." Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 7.
146 The amount of time that lapses before retaliation is approved by the DSB depends
on various factors including the amount of time afforded to the safeguard-imposing
Member to bring the safeguard measure into compliance. See DSU, supra note 10, art. 20,
21.3, 21.4, 22.2, & 22.6.
147 See Coughlin, supra note 62, at 8-9 (describing an alternative trade remedy in
detail).
148 See GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII (failing to provide defined limits for the
adjudication of disputes).
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disputes were never resolved. 149
The DSU's inadequacies in protecting against unlawful
safeguards are further demonstrated by the drastic scope of such
measures.
Because safeguards must be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, and may target a spectrum of products
that fall within a general category, the economic harm such
measures inflict are much more severe than those of other trade
remedies. The U.S. steel safeguards, for instance, imposed tariffs
ranging from eight to thirty percent on four broad categories and
thirty-three subcategories of steel products, resulting in tariff
revenue of nearly $650 million.15 0 In contrast, as stated above,
antidumping measures are imposed on a country-specific basis
and often on a narrower product category. For instance, a recent
antidumping order imposed by the U.S. government applied an
ad valorem tariff ranging from 17.33% to 128.59% on only one
subcategory of steel products covered by the U.S. steel
safeguards.15 1
The breadth of safeguard measures also imposes unparalleled
costs on the economies of both exporting and importing Members.
The value of lost exports alone (without accounting for exports of
downstream or upstream products) in the case of the U.S. steel
safeguard measure would have been worth $900 million by
conservative measures.152 Of this figure, the European Union
would have accounted for $561 million while Japan would have
accounted for $167 million.153 Isolated to the U.S. economy, the
149 Hans-Peter Werner, Lomg, the WTO and Bananas, 166 THE COURIER ACP-EU 59,
59 (1997), available at http://www.euforic.org/courierl166e-wer.htm? ("Under GATT,
trade disputes sometimes remained unresolved in view of the consensus needed to adopt
panel reports.").
150 See Steel Products Proclamation, supra note 2, at 10,553 (monitoring the
developments in the steel industry); see also Steel-Consuming Industries: Competitive
Conditions with Respect to Steel Safeguard Measures, USITC Pub. 3632, Inv. No. TA-32452, vol. III, at 4-5 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter ITC Mid-Term Review Report], available at
http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/332/pub3632/
pub3632-vol3_all.pdf
(listing
tariff
revenue at $649.9); see also Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 72, at 10 ("In the 12 months
following the safeguards, the US Customs Service Collected only $581 million in duties
from steel imports, which represents an increase of only $294 million (not $650 million)
over the 12 months before the safeguard.").
151 Suspension Agreement on Certain Cut-to-Length Steel Plate from the People's
Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,081 (Oct. 21, 2003) (discussing termination of
suspension agreement on certain cut-to-length carbon steel plate from People's Republic
of China and notice of antidumping order - importantly, cut-to-length plate was
considered part of broad flat-rolled steel category in steel safeguard measures).
152 Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 72, at 9 (providing in table 3 that the total
amount of exports lost could have been worth $900 million).
153 Id.; see, e.g., Peter Wonacott & Scott Miller, China Weighs Tariffs on U.S. Goods;
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safeguard affected about a quarter of all steel imports and cost
the U.S. economy over $980 million in only the first year and a
half that it was imposed, offsetting the corresponding increase in
tariff revenue and resulting in an estimated annual GDP loss of
$30.4 million.154 These figures still fail to capture the full extent
of downstream harm on both exporting and importing Members.
The unfairness that would result from requiring an affected
exporting Member to retaliate pursuant to the DSU is
aggravated by the non-retroactive character of remedies under
the WTO dispute settlement system. Under the DSU's remedial
scheme, prevailing complainants cannot retaliate for past
harms.15 5 Therefore, an affected exporting Member subject to an
improper safeguard will be irreparably harmed by the time the
DSB adopts a dispute panel or Appellate Body recommendation
in its favor. These features make the specialized retaliatory
mechanism of Article 8 a necessity, serving as a vehicle of
redressability unavailable under the DSU.
Conversely, prudential concerns of fairness mandate the
unilateral application of rebalancing measures pursuant to
Article 8. The ability to do so is symmetrical and proportional to
the unilateral right of a Member to impose a measure in
circumstances where affected exporting Members are not
Tough Talk in Steel Dispute Follows U.S. Textile Curbs; In EU, Questions on Tactics,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2003, at All (claiming that others have argued that the value of lost
E.U. steel imports were as low as 200 million). But see Martin Fackler & Scott Miller,
Asia and Brazil Show Restraint on Steel Tariffs; Countries Issue No Threats, Unlike the
EU, but Urge U.S. to Accept V/TO Ruling, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at A16 ("The
ministry has estimated that the U.S. measures add as much as $167 million a year in
tariffs on Japanese steal exports to the U.S.").
154 See ITC Mid-Term Review Report, supra note 150, at 4-2-4-5 (showing the
economic and industry specific effects of the safeguards measure).
155 See DSU, supra note 10, art. 19.1, art. 22.2 (describing the consultation and
dispute settlement process); see also BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 40-41
("Regarding the suspension of concessions, the general principle is that the complaining
Member first should seek to suspend concessions with respect to the same sector in which
the violation occurred."); see also JACKSON 1,supra note 46, at 184 (discussing retaliatory
action); Robert Z. Lawrence, Crimes & Punishment:An Analysis of Retaliation under the
WTO, EGYPTIAN CTR. FOR ECON. STUD.: DISTINGUISHED LECTURE SERIES 20, 8-13 (2003)
(explaining the system as one without any retaliation at all); see also ROBERT HUDEC,
BROADENING THE SCOPE OF REMEDIES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 15-19 (Friedl Weiss
& Jochem Wiers eds., 2000), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articlesl
hudecremedies.pdf ("[T]he prevailing view has been that the only remedy for violation of a
legal obligation is a forward-looking order to directing the defendant to comply in the
future."); see also Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195, 1254-59 (1998) ("GATT practice was traditionally remedial and
prospective in nature, with the aim of bringing Members into compliance with their
commitments.").
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committing an unfair trade practice.
iv. The Internal Conflict of Article 8
When viewed in light of the protracted dispute settlement
process, requiring an affected exporting Member to rely on the
DSU creates an inconsistency between Articles 8.2 and 8.3.
Article 8.2 requires rebalancing measures to be imposed within
ninety days from the time that the safeguard measure was
imposed. Because the DSB is unable to adopt a panel or
Appellate Body report until well after that ninety-day period, an
affected exporting Member is certainly unable to meet this
requirement if the Member allows the Article 8.3 determination
to be made pursuant to the DSU.
v. Article 8 as Lex Specialis
Against this background, any attempt to apply the DSU's
procedures in the context of rebalancing measures eviscerates
the very purpose of rebalancing measures, effectively writing
Article 8 out of the Safeguards Agreement. To accord full legal
effect to Article 8, it should be viewed as lex specialis - an
established exception to the general rules regarding dispute
settlement - especially given the unique character of safeguards
and the text of Article 8.2.
vi. The Role of the WTO Council
It is important to note that the right to rebalance is not
completely unilateral. Although the rebalancing right should not
be subject to the DSU under current circumstances, the decision
to rebalance is subject to the tacit approval of the Council under
Article 8. Therefore, the right to rebalance should be considered
unilateral only to the extent that it is not blocked by the Council.
More unclear, however, is whether the Council applies the
threshold requirements of Article 8.3 in tacitly approving
rebalancing. 56 Neither the Safeguards Agreement nor the
156 According to DAM, under GATT:
If agreement is not reached in the course of consultation ....
[T]he affected
contracting parties are entitled to suspend 'substantially equivalent concessions or
other obligations under [the General] Agreement the suspension of which the
CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.' No provisions specify the procedures to be
followed in connection with the review by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of retaliatory
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Council's rules addresses this issue. Nevertheless, the Council,
as a permanent standing body of the WTO, should be guided by a
set of rules in determining the adequacy of rebalancing
measures. The natural default for such a task are the standards
set forth in Article 8.3, especially in the absence of alternative
rules in measuring the legality of proposed rebalancing
measures. In addition, Article 13.1 of the Safeguards Agreement
requires the Committee on Safeguards, established under the
authority of the Council, "to receive and review all notifications
provided for in [the Safeguards Agreement] and report as
appropriate to the [Council]" and "to review ... whether
proposals to suspend concession or other obligations are
'substantially equivalent,' and report as appropriate to the
[Council] ."157
C. The Non-Preclusive Effect of Resorting to the DSU
Another issue raised by the relationship between the
Safeguards Agreement and DSU is whether an affected exporting
Member may rebalance once it has resorted to the DSU. This
issue arises from the interaction between the unilateral right of
an affected exporting Member to make the Article 8.3
determination and the willingness of affected exporting Members
to submit safeguard challenges to the WTO's dispute settlement
system prior to rebalancing. While this question seems relatively
inanimate given the mutually exclusive relationship between the
Safeguards Agreement and the DSU, it serves as a significant
issue surrounding safeguards and an obstacle to the continued
legitimacy and effectiveness of the safeguards system.
i. The Relationship between Article 8 and the DSU
Brought to the spotlight in U.S. - Steel Safeguards, some
commentators imply that preclusive effect should be accorded to
the remedy available under Article 8 once an affected exporting
action, but the language quoted indicates that a presumption is to be exercised in
favor of the acts of individual contracting parties.
DAM, supra note 22, at 104.
157 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 13.1; see Draft Text by the Chairman,
Safeguards,
23, MTN.GNG/NG9/W/25 (June 27, 1989) (stating the ways in which
contracting parties that are seriously affected by safeguard measures may suspend the
application of equivalent concessions or obligations).
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Member resorts to the DSU.158 This limitation, analogous to a
form of res judicata within the WTO regime, prohibits an affected
exporting Member from simultaneously taking advantage of the
relief available under both the Safeguards Agreement and the
DSU. These commentators believe that once safeguard disputes
are referred to the DSB, the DSU governs the compliance and
determination inquiries that are contained in Article 8.3 of the
Safeguards Agreement.
An adherence to the independent
authority of Article 8, however, reveals the defects of this
argument.
As discussed above, the remedy that Article 8 provides is
different from the one available under the DSU. Indeed, as
stated above, the extraordinary nature of safeguard measures
mandates a mechanism sufficient to protect affected exporting
Members and that is currently unavailable under the DSU. In
addition, the language and structure of the DSU and the
Safeguards Agreements mandates full legal effect to be accorded
to the remedial mechanism under both agreements. Therefore,
while both the Safeguards Agreement and the DSU provide
remedies for inconsistent safeguard measures, concurrent
jurisdiction should be accorded to both agreements. Under the
strict approach advocated by those commentators, however, an
affected exporting Member that resorts to the DSU in the first
instance possesses less than adequate means to protect itself
from immediate and irreparable harm.
ii. The Preferred Policy of Consultation and Dispute
Settlement
Moreover, an interpretation that prohibits an affected
exporting Member from relying on both agreements will have the
pernicious effect of discouraging Members from resorting to the
WTO's dispute settlement system. The DSU was created to
streamline the enforcement
of GATT-WTO
rules and
procedures. 1 59 Thus, submission of disputes to the DSB is an
158 See WOLFF & LIGHTHIZER, supra note 98, at 1-2 (explaining why complaining
parties in settlement proceedings challenging a safeguard measure in WTO must abide by
all rules and procedures of DSU).
159 See DSU, supra note 10, art. 3.2 ('The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system.").
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inconsistent trade measure. To promote such an approach, an
affected exporting Member should be allowed to resort to the
DSU in determining the legality of the underlying safeguard
measure, even while retaliating in the context of the Safeguards
Agreement. Indeed, the policy of encouraging affected exporting
Members to resort to the dispute settlement system is legitimized
by the absence of an impartial method by which to make the
Article 8.3 determination.
However, an affected exporting
Member will naturally shy away from referring a matter to the
DSU should it lose its right to rebalance upon triggering its
rights under the DSU.
iii. Article 8 Viewed as Injunctive Relief
Rather than according res judicataeffect to rebalancing claims,
Article 8 should be viewed as an indispensable form of temporary
relief analogous to a preliminary injunction under U.S. law. As
in the case of claims for injunctive relief, safeguard measures
have the potential to impose irreparable harm on affected
exporting Members. Thus, as stated above, the ability to impose
rebalancing measures, either for the purpose of forcing
compliance with the substantive requirements for imposing a
safeguard measure or alleviate the harms thereof, is critical as a
form of relief under the safeguards system.
In this context, a plaintiff is never denied injunctive relief for
simultaneously seeking permanent relief and a final legal
judgment; to do so would ignore the very purpose of injunctive
relief, which is to immediately redress harms resulting from acts
of potential illegality. By the same token, a Member should not
be denied the right to rebalance when it simultaneously
challenges the consistency of the underlying safeguard; to do so
would eviscerate the very purpose of Article 8, which is to
immediately restore the balance of concessions that was
disrupted by what an affected exporting Member views as an
inconsistent safeguard measure.
D. The Ninety-Day Restriction of Article 8.2
As stated above, an affected exporting Member "shall be free,
not later than 90 days after the measure is applied, to

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:3

suspend.. .the application of substantially equivalent concession
or other obligations under GATT 1994" if the threshold
requirements of Article 8.3 are met. Strictly interpreted, the
language of Article 8.2 clearly precludes the application of
rebalancing measures beyond the first ninety days of a safeguard
measure. Close examination of this provision reveals another
weakness of the safeguard mechanism and contributes to the
need for reform of the Safeguards Agreement. For the reasons
discussed below and until a change is made to the Safeguards
Agreement, Article 8 should be functionally interpreted to accord
a Member the flexibility to impose rebalancing measures beyond
the ninety-day period so long as it resorts to the DSU to
challenge the legality of the underlying safeguard measure.
i. The Facial Conflict between Articles 8.2 and 8.3
As an initial matter, the inability of an affected exporting
Member, under Article 8.2, to impose rebalancing measures after
ninety days clearly conflicts with Article 8.3, which gives an
affected exporting Member the unlimited right to impose
rebalancing measures after a three-year lapse of a safeguard
measure.
Thus, a literal interpretation of the ninety-day
restriction would render the text of Article 8.3 meaningless and
eviscerate the right that it embodies. This result was certainly
unintended by the drafters of the Safeguards Agreement and
underscores the inadequacies of that restriction.
To be sure, the negotiating history unequivocally portrays the
CONTRACTING PARTIES' intent to curtail the unilateral right to
rebalance in an effort to strengthen the safeguard mechanism.60
On the other hand, the negotiating history equally makes clear
that the parties did not intend to permanently sever that right,
as the drafters understood that an effective retaliatory right is
necessary to deter the potential abuse of safeguards.i 61 Article
8.3 serves as the balance struck by negotiating parties. But
strict adherence to the ninety-day provision renders Article 8.3
meaningless.
160 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (explaining why all parties were
unanimous in their desire to curb unilateral right to impose safeguards and rebalancing
measures).
161 See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (stating compensation and
retaliation rights were useful deterrents against unjustified safeguard measures).
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ii. The Futility and Frustrations of the Ninety-Day Restriction
As stated above, the procedural provisions of Article 8 are
intended to promote the policies of stability, cooperation, and
transparency. However, the ninety-day restriction falls short of
effectively contributing to those policies. As an initial matter,
Article 8's consultation and notification requirements are
sufficient to ensure stability, cooperation, and transparency
when a Member imposes a safeguard. When viewed against
those requirements, it remains uncertain whether the ninety-day
restriction even serves a valid purpose at all.
Not only is the ninety-day restriction archaic but it thwarts the
policies of stability and cooperation.
By forcing affected
exporting Members to actually impose rebalancing measures, the
ninety-day restriction compels affected exporting Members to
face the choice of hastily applying such measures or foregoing
that right for three years. In that situation, Members would
naturally choose to apply rebalancing measures within ninety
days, disrupting the balance of concessions that Article 8 seeks to
preserve and causing further adverse economic consequences on
the international economy. Concomitantly, in their haste to
apply rebalancing measures, affected exporting Members may do
so without adherence to the threshold requirements of Article
8.3. The potential effect is to frustrate ongoing - and even
discourage future - negotiations regarding the underlying
safeguard measure. More significantly, aware of the potential for
the illegitimate application of rebalancing measures, Members
may refuse to rely on safeguard measures and rely on other trade
remedies - antidumping and countervailing duty measures - to
counter the unexpected and harmful surge in imports. As a
result, the very purpose of the Safeguards Agreement - to
strengthen the safeguard mechanism - is effectively negated.
Ironically, the threat of applying rebalancing measures beyond
the ninety-day period likely facilitates settlement, as the
constant threat of rebalancing measures pressures Members into
terminating safeguard measures.1 6 2 This theory is consistent
with the modern idea that retaliation in the WTO has become an
accepted tool for inducing compliance.
In the same vein,
162 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 932 (describing how compensatory
settlement is facilitated).
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extension of the ninety-day period also allows adequate
opportunity for a safeguard-imposing Member to react to
proposed rebalancing measures and provide alternative
concessions. However, any incentive to terminate a safeguard
measure or propose alternative concessions ceases to exist if the
right of rebalancing is cut off after the initial ninety days of a
safeguard measure. The legitimacy of these policy justifications
are demonstrated in U.S. - Steel Safeguards, in which the EC's
continued threats of retaliation, which continued to be made even
after the initial ninety days of the U.S. safeguard measure,
served as an incentive for the United States to lift the measure.
The ability to impose rebalancing measures beyond ninety days
also forces safeguard-imposing Members to narrowly tailor their
measures to achieve the ends that are sought. Under Article 7.1
of the Safeguards Agreement, Members are obligated in a
number of ways and throughout the life of a safeguard measure
to adjust its scope. But without a perpetual right to rebalance,
no incentive exists for safeguard-imposing Members to adhere to
that requirement.
No less significant is the effect that the ninety-day restriction
has on the WTO's dispute settlement system. Forcing affected
exporting Members to apply rebalancing measures leaves less
incentive to pursue the matter under the DSU. However, the
disagreements that arise from the self-proclaimed right of
retaliation under Article 8.3 and the historical restraint of the
Council in disapproving proposed rebalancing measures warrant
increased reliance on the dispute settlement system. These
policy concerns are certainly sufficient to outweigh any utility
that arises from enforcing the ninety-day limitation.
Even more disconcerting is the potential proliferation of
safeguard measures as a result of a strict adherence to the
ninety-day restriction. An affected exporting Member unable to
apply rebalancing measures because it failed to do so within the
ninety-day period is more likely to resort to the implementation
of its own safeguard measure as an alternative form of
retaliation.1 63 Perhaps the effect of this has already been seen.
163 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Steel: Big Problems, Better Solutions,
INT'L ECON. POLY BRIEFS No. PB01-9, July 2001, at 11 ("[T]rade barriers have a way of
inspiring 'me-too' restrictions abroad, increasing the number of years (or decades) it takes
for the industry to adjust worldwide.").
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For instance, as a result of the U.S. steel safeguard measure, a
"domino effect" took place in which other WTO Members have
instituted safeguard investigations on steel exports:
In the first nine months of 2002, there have been 116
non-US safeguard investigations (94 in the "steel and
metals" industry including those by the European
Union and Canada) as compared to 20 non-US
safeguard investigations during the 12 months of
2001. For the first time, the worldwide number of new
safeguard investigations for all products is on track to
exceed
the
number
of
new
[antidumping]
investigations (109 through the first nine months of
2002), and the number of exporters included in a
safeguard investigation is always much larger than in
an [antidumping] investigation.164
Finally, the ninety-day restriction is contrary to the policy of
self-restraint.
Although the right to implement rebalancing
measures is unilateral and the authority to do so is not derived
from the DSU, self-restraint in applying rebalancing measures
within ninety days is consistent with a rule-based trading system
that provides rules and procedures for the orderly resolution of
disputes. The condemnation of such self-restraint by strictly
enforcing the ninety-day restriction only leads to more disputes
and economic barriers - a result contrary to the spirit of the
WTO. Indeed, WTO jurisprudence encourages parties to refrain
from the unilateral erection of economic barriers that would
disrupt the balance of concessions until a definitive resolution of
the dispute.16 5 Although rebalancing is an established exception
to that principle, an affected exporting Member should not be
punished for justifiable self-restraint.
iii. Political and Economic Considerations
Political and economic considerations also contribute to the
164 Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Steel Policy: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, INT'L ECON. POLY BRIEFS No. PB03-1, Jan. 2003, at 14.
165 See Panel Report, United States - Import Measures on CertainProducts from the
European Communities,
6.13-6.14, WT/DS165/R (July 17, 2000) (stating the
importance of why the DSU must be interpreted with the view to prohibiting unilateral
action); see also Panel Report, United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
7.88-7.90, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (noting the negative impact that unilateral
action could have on other Members as well as in the market-place).
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impracticability of imposing rebalancing measures within ninety
days. From a political perspective, it is highly unlikely that
Member governments can adequately determine whether and
how to retaliate within that time period.
Such a decision
involves extensive discussions and negotiations within and
outside the relevant decision-making authority.
This is
evidenced by the small number of occasions in which affected
exporting Members under GATT and the WTO have actually
applied rebalancing measures within ninety days.16 6
Economically, the decision to withhold the application of
rebalancing measures may logically flow from the universal
principle that retaliation is not beneficial to the affected
exporting Member because it not only harms the economy of the
safeguard-imposing Member but equally encumbers the economy
of the rebalancing Member.1 67 This notion further frustrates the
ability of the relevant decision-making authority to decide
whether to impose rebalancing measures within ninety days.
Moreover, an accurate level of "substantially equivalent
concessions or other obligations" may not be easily ascertainable
within that time period, particularly in a case where an affected
exporting Member recently started to export goods to the
safeguard-imposing country. 16 8
Accordingly, the longer an affected exporting Member delays
the application of rebalancing measures, the decision to impose
rebalancing measures is more likely to be based on reasoned
judgment, reflect the will of the relevant domestic constituency,
and constitute "substantially equivalent concessions or other
obligations." 169
iv. Protective Measure?
Members may argue that the ninety-day restriction serves as a
protective measure which discourages the unexpected and/or
166 Over 100 safeguard measures were imposed under GATT. Of those, rebalancing
measures seem to have been imposed within the ninety-day period on only one occasion
(i.e., not beyond the ninety-day period or without mutual agreement to extent the ninetyday period). See Article XIX - United States: Increase in Duties in the Customs Tariff of
the EuropeanEconomic Community, L/1803 (June 22, 1962).
167 See Lawrence, supra note 155, at 36-39 (explaining the effects of rebalancing and
retaliation).
168 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 8.2.
169

Id.
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delayed application of rebalancing measures. Indeed, under U.S.
law, unreasonable delay in filing for an injunction precludes
provisional relief.17 0 This idea is analogous to the equitable
concepts of laches and estoppel, which are recognized under
international law in a number of forms.171 Applied to the
situation at hand, those concepts would prevent an affected
exporting Member from invoking its rebalancing rights on the
grounds that either: 1) unreasonable delay in obtaining relief
warrants the preclusion of those rights, or 2) the safeguardimposing Member has detrimentally relied on the former
Member's failure to invoke those rights within ninety days. In
this context, the restriction can be viewed as a protective
measure designed to discourage the delayed and/or sudden
application of rebalancing measures that would give an affected
exporting Member an unfair advantage.17 2 This argument,
however, proves unavailing.
First, the inequities arising from a sudden application of
rebalancing measures is adequately alleviated by the notification
and consultation requirements.
Under any scenario, a
safeguard-imposing Member would be aware of the potential
application of rebalancing measures well before the time of
actual application, eliminating the need for applying the laches
doctrine. This argument has greater force where the affected
exporting Member first resorts to the DSU within the ninety-day
170 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243, 244-45 (8th Cir. 1987)
("Laches may be used to bar a lawsuit when the plaintiff is guilty of (1) unreasonable and
unexcused delay, (2) resulting in prejudice to the defendant."); Cent. Point Software, Inc.
v. Global Software & Accessories, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 640, 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[P]laintiffs'
extensive delay in bringing this motion for a preliminary injunction undercuts any claim
of urgency to the preliminary relief now sought.").
171 See Iran Nat'l Airlines Co. v. United States, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 187, 190
(1987) (applying laches due to fairness); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18 (5th ed. 1998) ("In a number of cases the principle of estoppel
or acquiescence (pr4clusion) has been relied on by the Court, and on occasion rather
general references to abuse of rights and good faith may occur."); see also Ashraf Ray
Ibrahim, Note, The Doctrine of Laches in InternationalLaw, 83 VA. L. REV. 647, 651-52
(1997) ("[D]octrine of laches and the related doctrines of acquiescence and estoppel will
bar a claim from adjudication before an international tribunal."); see also Panel Report,
Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, 7.20, WT[DS241/R
(Apr. 22, 2003) ("[T]he essential elements of estoppel are '(i) a statement of fact which is
clear and unambiguous; (ii) this statement must be voluntary, unconditional, and
authorized; (iii) there must be reliance in good faith upon the statement ... to the
advantage of the party making the statement.").
172 However, as explained in further detail below, this argument should not apply
where a party waives any obligation of the other party to immediately impose rebalancing
measures.
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time period. In such a case, the safeguard-imposing Member will
be put on notice of any safeguard challenges and, thus, the
potential application of rebalancing measures.
Second, the delayed application of rebalancing measures is in
the interest of both the safeguard-imposing Member and affected
exporting Members given that rebalancing only causes additional
economic harms. This is proven by the frequent extension, if not
complete disregard, of the ninety-day restriction - to the point of
driving it to obscurity.1 73
Third, WTO dispute panels have not received the estoppel
argument with open arms. 174 Even if they did, the safeguardimposing Member would unlikely incur any detriment from an
affected exporting Member's failure to apply rebalancing
measures within ninety days, undermining the need to invoke
the estoppel doctrine. This is particularly true where an affected
exporting Member resorts to the DSU, as the arguments made by
both sides once an affected exporting Member resorts to the DSU
will be identical to those that are made under Article 8.3 of the
Safeguards Agreement, with no time or legal ground lost to
either side.
v. The Unfairness of the Ninety-Day Restriction
The validity of the ninety-day limitation is obviated when
viewed against the prudential concern of fairness. As discussed
above, the extraordinary nature of safeguard measures
necessitates a defensive mechanism adequate to shield affected
exporting Members from the adverse effects of such measures.
173 See supra notes 163, 166 and accompanying text.
174 See Panel Report, European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar: Complaint
by Australia, 7.75, WT/DS265/R (Oct. 15, 2004) ("[flf [the Panel] were to conclude that
the Complainants are now estopped from challenging the EC sugar regime or its alleged
excessive export production of subsidized sugar, the Panel would be acting contrary to
Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU .... ); see also Panel Report, European Communities Export Subsidies on Sugar, Complaint by Brazil,
7.75, WT/DS266R (Oct. 15, 2004)
(repeating Australia's opinion); see also Panel Report, European Communities - Export
Subsidies on Sugar, Complaint by Thailand,
7.75, WT/DS283/R (Oct. 15, 2004)
(restating Australia and Brazil's opinion); see also Panel Report, Argentina - Definitive
Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil,
7.38, WT/DS241/R (Apr. 22, 2003)
(claiming that estoppel can only 'result from the express, or in exceptional cases implied
consent of the complaining parties"'); see also Panel Report, European Communities Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India: Recourse to Article
21.4 of the DSU by India, 6.91, WT/DS141/RW (Nov. 29, 2002) (stating that they do not
consider the question of estoppel); Panel Report, Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico,
8.24, WTIDS156/R (Oct. 24, 2000)
(explaining how they dealt with the arguments of estoppel).
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Without the ability to counteract inconsistent safeguard
measures, the right to impose them becomes unlimited.
Although Article 8 places no premium on damages and focuses
solely on the balance of concessions, irreparable harm is the
harsh outcome of safeguard measures. The ability of an affected
exporting Member to effectively deter such harm is hindered by
the ninety-day restriction.
Although an affected exporting
Member is free to exercise its retaliatory right within ninety
days, doing so is inconsistent with the policies underlying the
WTO and threatens the legitimacy of the Safeguards Agreement
and the DSU.
The debilitating consequence of a safeguard measure is central
to understanding the need to apply rebalancing measures beyond
the ninety-day period. Similarly, an understanding of its history
illustrates how the ninety-day restriction is outdated and
imposes an unfair limitation on affected exporting Members.
When safeguard measures were originally engineered, it was
uncertain whether it applied on an MFN basis.1 75 Thus, its full
potential in crippling the economy of both an affected exporting
Member and the international community went unrealized. This
was intensified by the relative infrequency with which safeguard
measures were invoked, thereby concealing the true extent of
harm on the multilateral trading system. Only when safeguard
measures were imposed pursuant to the MFN requirement of the
Safeguards Agreement did the far-reaching effects of a safeguard
measure become wholly apparent. By then, the whole-scale
adoption of the boilerplate procedures contained in GATT Article
XIX:3(a) had taken place.
The inability to rebalance after ninety days, however, imposes
unfair restrictions on affected exporting Members, which are
unable to offset the adverse effects of an inconsistent measure
that is applied unilaterally. And for reasons stated above, the
imposition of safeguard measures within ninety days is simply
impracticable and counter to the ideals of the WTO. Simply put,
the ninety-day restriction renders the remedy afforded to affected
exporting Members insufficient to deter the potential harm
resulting from illegal safeguard measures.
The unfairness of the ninety-day limitation is highlighted by
175 See supra notes 91, 95 and accompanying text.
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the scenario in which a Member does not export to the safeguardimposing country but does so after ninety days from the time at
which the safeguard measure was imposed. In that situation, the
affected exporting Member is precluded from applying
rebalancing measures.
Although such a Member was
theoretically availed of the opportunity to suspend equivalent
concessions, it is highly unlikely that a Member would do so
without some tangible harm incurred. Moreover, suspension of
concessions in such a situation is most likely inconsistent with
WTO rules, as no basis for suspension even exists.
Thus,
fairness dictates the ability to impose rebalancing measure
beyond the ninety-day period.
vi. The Need for a Functional Interpretation
Although the touchstone of WTO adjudication remains subject
to continuous debate, a paramount goal of the WTO's dispute
settlement system is to establish and implement legal processes
that are "adapted to the subject matter and designed to resolve
disputes that cannot be foreseen at the moment when those
procedures are established."1 76 Indeed, that aim is consistent
with the disposition of WTO agreements as diplomatic
instruments in which precise rules were unattainable as a
practical matter. 17 7
Against this background, adequate consideration must be
accorded to sources that speak to the validity and contribute to
the interpretation of a given provision. To be sure, interpretation
of a WTO rule cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Resort must be
had to the historical context of applicable rules and agreements,
the object and purpose emanating from applicable rules and
agreement, and the structure of WTO agreements. This principle
is particularly relevant where the ordinary meaning of a given
provision would lead to a result that is inconsistent with its
underlying purpose. Indeed, it is a well-established practice of
international law to take account of alternative sources where a
literal interpretation leads to an unreasonable outcome. 178 The
176 DAM, supra note 22, at 4; See supra notes 91, 95 and accompanying text.
177 See HUDEC, supra note 155, at 17 ("[A]ttitude toward GATT law was consistent
with the view of GATT law as a diplomatic instrument - a set of rules whose primary
function was to aid in resolving trade disputes in consensual fashion.").
178 VCLT, supra note 132, art. 31 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
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facial conflict between Articles 8.2 and 8.3 presents such a
situation.
In turn, reliance on these alternative sources
contributes to the resolution of the dynamic issues that arise
from interpreting an instrument regulating international
economic relations such as the Safeguards Agreement.
vii. A Pragmatic Interpretation
Article 8.2 should therefore be interpreted so as to allow an
affected exporting Member to impose rebalancing measures
beyond the ninety-day period so long as it resorts to the DSU to
challenge the legality of the underlying safeguard measure.
Once a WTO dispute panel has found that the underlying
safeguard measure is not based on an absolute increase in
imports or is inconsistent with the Safeguards Agreement, an
affected exporting Member should still be able to impose
rebalancing measures. Absent resort to the DSU, however,
Article 8.2 mandates an interpretation that requires an affected
exporting Member to impose rebalancing measures within the
ninety-day period.
Such an interpretation is in full accord with the purpose of
Article 8 and absolves the deficiencies created by the drafters in
failing to delineate a more impartial method by which to make
the Article 8.3 determination. Moreover, it preserves the policies
of stability, cooperation, and transparency underlying the DSU.
Indeed, failure of an affected exporting Member to exercise its
right to implement rebalancing measures within ninety days is a
result of its good-faith adherence to the policy of adjudicating
disputes under the DSU and its willingness to preserve the
And only by allowing for such an
economic status quo.
concerns of fairness be adequately
will
the
interpretation
redressed. Most importantly, the interpretation yields a result
that preserves the legitimacy of the safeguards system.
Although it may be argued that elimination of the restriction
would lead to the unbridled application of rebalancing measures,
the restriction is only a procedural mechanism that was never
intended to cut off the right to rebalance.1 79 And as described
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
179 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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above, the burdens posed by the ninety-day restriction outweigh
the utility, if any, that it serves.18 0 Given that Article 8.3 was
adopted as the operative provision to limit that right, concerns of
unlimited rebalancing are better alleviated by addressing the
weaknesses of that provision, as opposed to a literal application
of Article 8.2.181
III. CASE STUDY: THE U.S. STEEL SAFEGUARD DISPUTE AND THE
RIGHT TO REBALANCE

The divergent approaches of the affected exporting Members in
U.S. - Steel Safeguards serve as an ideal reference in addressing
the interpretive dilemmas and retaliatory constraints posed by
Article 8 of the Safeguards Agreement. As stated in Section I,
the approach taken by the affected exporting Members in the
U.S. steel safeguard dispute falls into two categories. In the first,
the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, Norway and the
People's Republic of China (the "EU camp") each notified the
Council, within the ninety-day period set forth in Article 8.2, of
their intent to implement rebalancing measures to offset the
adverse effects of the U.S. steel safeguard action. 182 In the
second, Brazil, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan (the
"Brazil camp") each issued a joint communication, within the
ninety-day period set forth in Article 8.2, with the United States
that reserved their reciprocal rights under that article and
extended the ninety-day period from June 3, 2002 to March 20,
2005.183
180 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Affected exporting Members in other instances have taken a third approach:
notification of proposed rebalancing measures within the ninety-day time period set forth
in Article 8.2 of the Safeguards Agreement, but delayed implementation of those
measures until expiration of the safeguard at issue or until the DSB's adoption of a
finding that the safeguard is WTO-inconsistent. See Norway, Notification under Article
12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed
Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph2 of Article 8
of the Agreement on Safeguards, G/L/738 (Apr.. 7, 2005); Turkey, Notification under Article
12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed
Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph2 of Article 8
of the Agreement on Safeguards, G/SG/N/12/TUR/I (Dec. 12, 2002); European
Commission, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to
the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other
Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards,
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Despite the differing approaches, both camps refrained from
the de facto application of rebalancing measures on U.S. exports.
It is all but certain that the affected exporting Members were
delaying retaliation until adoption by the DSB of an Appellate
Body decision ruling in their favor. Consequently, each camp
posed unique issues regarding the application of rebalancing
measures pursuant to Article 8.2. Specifically, the question
presented by the EU camp is whether an affected exporting
Member that resorts to the DSU is foreclosed from imposing
rebalancing measures beyond the ninety days set forth in Article
8.2. The issue surrounding the Brazil camp is whether legal
validity should be accorded to a waiver agreement extending the
ninety-day period set forth in Article 8.2 to allow the affected
exporting Member to delay implementation of rebalancing
measures until after the expiration of that time period.
In the weeks following the Appellate Body decision that
vindicated the affected exporting Members, the legal issues
raised by their actions were eclipsed by the more immediate and
less esoteric question of compliance. In the end, the United
States surrendered to threats of retaliation when it lifted the
steel safeguard measure.1 8 4 Thus, resolution of the above issues
was sidestepped. Yet, examination of these issues is essential for
determining the legality of future rebalancing measures and
assessing the weaknesses of the current Safeguards Agreement.
A. The EU Camp
As stated above, an affected exporting Member "shall be free,
not later than 90 days after the measure is applied, to
suspend... the application of substantially equivalent concession
or other obligations under GATT 1994" once the threshold
requirements of Article 8.3 are met. Strictly interpreted, the
language of Article 8.2 precludes the application of rebalancing
measures beyond the first ninety days of a safeguard measure.
The actions of the EU camp, however, should form the basis for
allowing the imposition of rebalancing measures beyond the first
ninety days of the U.S. steel safeguard measure.
G/L251 (Aug. 3, 1998).
184 Proclamation No. 7741, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,483 (Dec. 4, 2003).
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First and foremost, the EU camp resorted to the WTO's dispute
settlement system to challenge the legality of the U.S. safeguard
measure. As discussed above, such a move is consistent with the
policies of challenging disputes pursuant to the DSU and
avoiding the unilateral imposition of economic barriers.
Second, although falling short of applying rebalancing
measures, the EU camp notified the Council, within Article 8.2's
ninety-day time period, of its intent to impose rebalancing
measures. Therefore, the EU camp's approach was consistent
with the policies of stability, transparency, and cooperation. As a
result, the United States was unable to argue that it was
unaware or harmed by the EU camp's failure to impose
rebalancing measures within the first ninety days of the U.S.
steel safeguard measure.
The WTO should continue to accord validity to the EU camp's
approach, allowing Article 8.2 to be interpreted to allow an
affected exporting Member to impose rebalancing measures after
the ninety-day time period so long as it resorts to the DSU to
determine the legality of the underlying safeguard measure.
Although any retaliation would have been made in the context of
the DSU because the DSB adopted the reports in U.S. - Steel
Safeguards, the approach of the EU camp should have allowed it
to impose rebalancing measures after the ninety-day period had
it chosen to do so.
B. The Brazil Camp
Contrary to the question posed by the EU camp, the issue
raised by the Brazil camp is more easily resolved given the
mechanism that was invoked by the affected exporting Members.
A joint communication is a notification of a bilateral agreement
that waives certain rights and obligations between parties. As
demonstrated below, the WTO agreements, as well as GATTWTO jurisprudence, support the validity of such agreements.
i.

The DSU and the Safeguards Agreements

Numerous provisions in the DSU support the use of bilateral
agreements such as joint communications.1 8 5 DSU Article 3.6, for
185 See DSU, supra, note 10, arts. 3.6, 3.7, 11 (stating that DSU's aim is to encourage
mutually acceptable solutions).
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instance, states that "[m]utually agreed solutions to matters
formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB
and the relevant Councils and Committees, where any Member
may raise any point relating thereto."186
Indeed, as demonstrated by the following provisions and
confirmed by WTO jurisprudence,i8 7 the DSU goes as far as
establishing a preference for mutually acceptable agreements
over continued adjudication and retaliation:
* Article 3.7: Before bringing a case, a Member shall
exercise its judgment as to whether action under these
procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute
settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to
a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties
to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements
1S8
is clearly to be preferred.
" Article 11: The function of panels is to assist the DSB in
discharging
its
responsibilities
under
this
Understanding and the covered agreements ....
Panels
should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute
and give them adequate opportunity to develop a
mutually satisfactory solution.18 9
Likewise, the Safeguards Agreement itself contemplates the
use of bilateral agreements:
0 Article 12.3: A Member proposing to apply or extend a
safeguard measure shall provide adequate opportunity
for prior consultations with those Members having a
substantial interest as exporters of the product
concerned,
with
a
view
to...
reaching an
understandingon ways to achieve the objective set out in
186 DSU, supra note 10, art. 3.6.
187 See Panel Report, United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea: Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Korea, 10, WT[DS99/RW (Nov. 7, 2000) (reporting that the
parties notified "the DSB of a mutually agreed solution to the matter under review"); see
also Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Butter Products, 13,
WT/DS72/R (Nov. 24, 1999) (noting that the parties reported they had reached "a
mutually agreed solution"); see also Panel Report, European Communities - Trade
Description of Scallops: (Request by Canada),
15, WT/DS7/R (Aug. 5, 1996) ("[The
parties notified the DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees that they had reached
a mutually agreed solution ... ").
188 DSU, supra note 10, art. 3.7 (emphasis added).
189 Id. art. 11 (emphasis added).
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paragraph1 of Article 8.190
Article 12.5: The results of the consultations referred to
in this Article, as well as the results of... any form of
compensation referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 8,
and proposed suspensions of concessions and other
obligations referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8, shall
be notified immediately to the Council for Trade in
Goods by the Members concerned.191
Although the above provisions fall short of an express
authorization for joint communications, it serves as an implicit
recognition and endorsement of such agreements.
The language of those provisions arguably limits the WTO's
endorsement of agreements to settlements of the underlying
dispute. Nevertheless, given the expansive language of the
provisions, the policy of recognizing bilateral agreements should
apply with equal force to issues not dispositive of a dispute's
merits. Put another way, the DSU's principal aim of reaching
mutually acceptable solutions should also extend to issues
relating to the dispute settlement process itself (i.e., procedural
issues), such as deadlines, especially because resolution of such
secondary issues contribute to the ultimate settlement of the
dispute. 192
*

ii.

GATT-WTO Practice

The validity of joint communications is reinforced by GATTWTO jurisprudence. As a general matter, WTO adjudicative
bodies have frequently recognized the validity of bilateral
agreements that alter the rights and obligations of parties,
particular those that extend deadlines fixed by the DSU. To
date, none have been explicitly challenged under the DSU.
Similarly, the DSB has never expressed any opposition toward
such agreements. Rather, the WTO's attitude toward bilateral
agreements has been of open acceptance.1 93 Indeed, complaining
190 See Safeguards Agreement, supranote 8, art. 12.3 (emphasis added).
191 Id. art. 12.5 (emphasis added).
192 Further contributing to the validity of joint communications are the interpretive
rules on international agreements under VCLT Article 31.3(a), which mandates
consideration of subsequent agreements between parties regarding the application of an
agreement's provisions under certain circumstances.
193 For example, in United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, the DSU Article 21.3 arbitrator
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parties have often requested, and the DSB has agreed to,
extensions of the "reasonable period of time," elucidating the
willingness of the DSB to modify the time limits set forth in DSU
Articles 21 and 22.194 Given such willingness, it should be of no
surprise that the DSB allows extensions that are made between
95
parties themselves. 1
Since the advent of GATT, a "practice has evolved of extending
the ninety-day period referred to in paragraph 3(a) of [GATT]
Article XIX through bilateral agreement between the contracting
parties concerned with subsequent submission of a joint
found it unnecessary to determine a "reasonable period of time" for compliance because a
bilateral agreement was reached as to that issue, even though no DSU provision allows
for such agreements. Arbitrator Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea: Arbitration under
Article 21.3(c) of the Understandingon Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, 7 9, WT/DS202/17 (July 26, 2002).
194 See Proposed Modification of the Reasonable Period of Time under Article 21.3 of
the DSU, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/14 (July 18,
2001) (petitioning for "an extension of time"); see also Proposed Modification of the
Reasonable Period of Time under Article 21.3 of the DSU, United States - Anti-Dumping
Act of 1916, WT/DS136/13 (July 18, 2001) (proposing that "an extension" would promote
one of the principle aims of the dispute settlement system); see also Request for
Modification of the Time-Period for Compliance, United States - Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations",WT/DS108/11 (Oct. 2, 2000) ("The United States believes
that an extension of the time-period promotes [the dispute settlement system's] aim.").
195 Other cases reflect the liberal attitude of WTO adjudicative bodies regarding time
limits imposed by DSU Articles 21 and 22. In Brazil - Aircraft, for instance, the arbitrator
ignored the strict time limit contained in DSU Article 22.6 in favor of a bilateral
agreement that existed between the parties regarding issues of timing. Decision by the
Arbitrators, Brazil - Export FinancingProgrammefor Aircraft: Recourse to Arbitration by
Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, TT 2.1-2.3,
WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000). Article 22.6, in pertinent part, reads:
When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs [failure to reach a
compensation agreement within 20 days after the expiration of the "reasonable
period of time"], the DSB, upon request, shall grant authorization to suspend
concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonableperiod
of time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.
Decision by the Arbitrators, United States- Anti-Dumping Act of 1916: Recourse to
Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, T 4.2, WT/DS136/ARB
(Feb. 24, 2004) (emphasis added). Brazil terminated the bilateral agreement during the
course of resolving the implementation issues under DSU Article 21.5, and subsequently
argued before the DSU Article 22.6 arbitrator that the thirty-day time limit for
authorizing retaliation had passed, precluding Canada's request and invalidating
authorization. See id. 7 3.6, 3.9. Put another way, Brazil's interpretation of DSU Article
22.6 was that the thirty-day period was an explicit and mandatory deadline.
The arbitrator ruled that Canada's request was unaffected by the termination because
it was made pursuant to the bilateral agreement prior to its termination. See id.
3.10.
In a footnote, the arbitrator also observed that the interpretation of the first sentence of
Article 22.6 offered by Brazil had not been strictly followed by the DSB to that time. See
id.
3.9 n.22. The footnote cited the request by Ecuador to suspend concessions under
Article 22.6 in the EC - Bananas, noting that it was made several months after the
adoption of the Article 21.5 panel report. See id. Thus, at a minimum, the arbitrator could
identify no existing practice or jurisprudence warranting Brazil's interpretation. See id.
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communication" to the CONTRACTING PARTIES.196 In 1975, the
GATT Council acknowledged certain precedent supporting the
validity of joint communications.197 In doing so, the GATT
Council refrained from voicing any objection to the EC's request
to prolong the ninety-day period by mutual agreement.1 98 In the
view of certain representatives of the GATT Council,
continuation of consultations was preferred over retaliation.199
Although in 1981 Australia challenged the validity of joint
communications, the Council refrained from expressing any
position. 2 00 Finally, in 1984, the GATT Director-General
expressed the sovereign right of a contracting party to extend the
ninety-day period by mutual agreement. 20 1
The validity of joint communications has similarly extended to
the WTO. Since the WTO Safeguards Agreement has been in
force, approximately 15 joint communications extending the
ninety-day period of Article 8.2 have been filed.202 To date, none
196 GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 74, at 487. Under GATT,
CONTRACTING PARTIES have on numerous occasions made decisions to extend the ninetyday period. See Article XIX - Action by the United States: Specialty Steel, Extension of
Time-Limit, L/5524/Add.1 (Sept. 26, 1983) (reflecting the extension agreement between
Austria and the United States); see also Article XIX - Action by the United States:
Specialty Steel, Extension of Time-Limit, L/5524/Add.5 (Oct. 31, 1983) (demonstrating
another extension agreement); see also Article XIX- Action by the United States: Specialty
Steel, Extension of Time-Limit, L/5524/Add.11 (Dec. 1, 1983) (stating that the United
States and European Communities have agreed to extend the ninety-day period); see also
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 929 (explaining how sometimes the ninety-day
period is extended by agreement "between the Member invoking the escape clause and the
interested Members").
197 Minutes of Council Meeting, at 20-21, C/M103 (Feb. 18, 1975) (claiming that
continued consultation is the better course than retaliation).
198 See GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 74, at 487-88 (quoting the
February 1975 Council meeting which demonstrated that no objection to the extension of
time had been voiced).
199 See Minutes of Council Meeting, at 20-21, C/MI103 (Feb. 18, 1975) ("A number of
representatives stated that they had never encountered any difficulty in reaching
agreement with the other party for an extension of the period referred to in Article
XIX:3(a) in order to continue consultations rather than having recourse to retaliation.").
200 See Article XIX - Action by Australia: Certain Works Trucks and Stackers,
L/5026/Add.10 (July 13, 1981) (positing that the GATT Council "had left the matter
unresolved").
201 Minutes of Council Meeting, at 11, C/M174(Feb. 24, 1984) ('The Director-General
said that if the Community agreed to the US request for an extension of the date of entry
into force of the retaliatory measures, this could be done.").
202 Joint Communication from Australia and the United States, Immediate
Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in
Goods Concerning United States Action in Respect of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat,
G/L/339 (Oct. 27, 1999); Joint Communication from Argentina and the European
Communities, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards
to the Council for Trade in Goods Concerning Argentina's Action in Respect of Imports of
Footwear, G/L1366 (Apr. 19, 2000); Joint Communication from the United States and
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have been challenged and the Council has never expressed any
opposition towards such understandings.
Indeed, WTO
adjudicative bodies themselves have extended deadlines set by
the DSU.203
iii. Policy Concerns
The unique facets of a joint communication nonetheless raise
issues of its continued validity.
Namely, its status as a
mechanism that is not explicitly endorsed by any WTO
agreement begs the question of its legality in preserving certain
rights and obligations.
The endorsement of such measures
potentially opens the door to other actions unsanctioned by the
GATT-WTO regime.
Indeed, as in the case of grey-area
measures, a joint communication arguably runs counter to the
ideals of a rule-based trading system by allowing Members to
evade their mutual commitments and a universal code of conduct
European Communities, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on
Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods Concerning United States Action in Respect
of Line Pipe, G/L/376 (May 3, 2000); Joint Communication from the United States and the
European Communities, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on
Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods Concerning United States Action in Respect
of Certain Steel Wire Rod, GL/375 (May 3, 2000); Joint Communication from Argentina
and Indonesia, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards
to the Council for Trade in Goods Concerning Argentina's Action in Respect of Imports of
Footwear, G/J378 (May 4, 2000); Joint Communication from the United States and
Japan, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the
Council for Trade in Goods Concerning United States Action in Respect of Line Pipe,
G/L/382 (June 6, 2000); Joint Communication from the United States and Japan,
Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council
for Trade in Goods Concerning United States Action in Respect of Certain Steel Wire Rod,
G/L/381 (June 6, 2000); Joint Communication from Brazil and the European
Communities, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards
to the Council for Trade in Goods Concerning Brazil's Action in Respect of Toys,
G/SG/N/12/BRA/1/Add.1/Corr.1 (July 7, 2000); Joint Communication from the European
Communities and Egypt, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on
Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods Concerning Egypt's Action in Respect of
Imports of Powdered Milk, G/L]458 (July 25, 2001).
203 For example, the Article 21.3 arbitrator in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
extended the ninety-day period with respect to completion of the arbitration. Arbitrator's
Award, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages: Arbitration under Article 21(3)(c) of the
Understandingon Rules and ProceduresGoverning the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS8/15
(Feb. 14, 1997). Similarly, the Article 22.6 arbitrator in European Communities - Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distributionof Bananas extended the sixty-day time period
for completion of their work. Arbitrators' Decision, European Communities - Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999).
While the matters discussed above are by no means reflective of an established trend,
particularly in light of the type of proceedings at issue, there clearly exists a willingness
on behalf of WTO adjudicative bodes to adjust the time limits contained in DSU Articles
21 and 22 where justifiable circumstances are present, such as the existence of a bilateral
agreement between the parties.
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on account of convenience, thereby endorsing modifications to
trade undertakings outside the rubric of the GATT-WTO system.
Thus, it remains imperative to identify the policy rationales that
serve as the foundation for a joint communication's legal
viability.
A joint communication is an agreement voluntarily entered
into by WTO Members that waives or reserves certain rights or
obligations. The legal validity of such an agreement derives from
the sovereign right of a nation to willingly abrogate the
obligations to which it is owed rather than any specific GATT or
WTO provision. As such, the arguments in opposition of greyarea measures are equally applicable to joint communications.
However, several considerations outweigh the validity of those
arguments in the context of joint communications. First, the
concern of unfair bargaining does not strongly materialize where
both parties reserve their reciprocal rights under GATT or any
WTO agreement.
Likewise, the concern that joint
communications are negotiated outside the auspices of a rulebased trading system is negated where the parties recognize the
preeminence of WTO law and the ultimate result of the joint
communication is adherence to the institution's rules and/or
settlement of the underlying dispute.
Second, the validity of voluntary obligations should have
greater force in the context of technical obligations, such as
statutory deadlines that do not alter substantive trade
concessions between Members.
Third, concerns of non-transparency are extinguished because
the parties to a joint communication notify the relevant WTO
body and, thus, the entire membership of the action. In the case
of a safeguard measure, parties to a joint communication notify
the Council of their intent to extend the time period set forth in
Article 8.2. Indeed, the joint communication effectively fulfills
the object and purpose of Article 8's notification provision - to
put interested parties on proper notice of intended rebalancing
measures - through submission of such an agreement. As a
result, the argument of unreasonable delay or estoppel raised in
support of the ninety-day provision has no application in the
context of a joint communication.
Finally, a joint communication furthers the WTO's policy of
open consultation and settlement of disputes. As stated by one
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scholar, "[a]ny extension is designed to facilitate settlement on
compensation to the interested Members and thereby obviate the
2 04
need for retaliation."
These policy arguments clearly justify the continued legality of
joint communications that extend the ninety-day limitation of
Article 8.2. Any issues raised by the application of rebalancing
measures beyond the actual ninety-day period does not provide
the basis to denigrate the legitimacy of a joint communication
extending that time period. Indeed, the WTO, as an institution
whose legitimacy is dependent upon the mutual recognition and
adherence of rights and obligations by its Members, should
continue to respect the sovereign entitlement of its Members to
2 05
waive certain rights.
iv. The Validity of Joint Communications
Absent any impropriety, such an agreement should be upheld
so as to allow a party to unilaterally and immediately implement
rebalancing measures beyond the ninety-day period set forth in
Article 8.2. In order for an affected exporting Member that
reserved its right to rebalance through a joint communication to
invoke that right, it must properly notify the WTO Council for
Trade in Goods of its intent "to suspend. . . the application of
substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations" and
wait thirty days. 2 06 Provided that the Council does not
disapprove the proposed rebalancing measures, the affected
exporting measure should be free to apply rebalancing measures
to exports of the safeguard-imposing Member beyond the ninetyday time period in Article 8.2.
IV. THE NEED FOR REFORM AND A REFEREE

The discussion above reflects how we think the Safeguards
Agreement must be interpreted given current circumstances. In
our view, the right to rebalance following imposition of a
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 929.
205 See Joost Pauwelyn, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on
Non-World Trade Organization Law?: Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits, 37(6) J. OF
WORLD TRADE 997, 1007 (2003) (detailing that since both the United States and Australia
agreed not to appeal, they did not affect any third party rights, and therefore the
Appellate Body must respect this agreement and decline jurisdiction).
206 See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 8, art. 8.2.
204
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safeguard measure is too important not to reach our conclusion.
That being said, we do not view this approach as ideal, as it does
not serve the WTO's goals of furthering the security and
predictability of the multilateral trading system. However, we
are constrained by the current language of the Safeguards
Agreement and the lack of special dispute settlement rules
applicable to safeguard measures, as exist for prohibited
subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures ("SCM Agreement").
In our perfect world, the
Safeguards Agreement needs to be revised to ensure
maintenance of Members' rights to impose safeguard measures,
impose rebalancing measures, and obtain effective relief from
measures of either sort that are ultimately-but quicklydeemed inconsistent with the WTO obligations. The aim of such
revisions would be to remove the instability and arguable
illegitimacy of the current safeguard system caused by the
imperfect text of Article 8, and establish a workable, predictable,
and timely safeguard-specific method for settling safeguard
disputes.
The first revision we recommend is clarification of the ninetyday time restriction set forth in Article 8.2. Obviously, for the
reasons stated above, this restriction makes no sense if the right
to rebalance is delayed until after three years pursuant to the
first clause of Article 8.3. We recommend that the ninety-day
restriction be scrapped in favor of the dispute settlement
procedures set forth below. 2 0 7
Article 8.3 should also be clarified to allow rebalancing
measures to be imposed unilaterally. (If the drafters did not
intend a unilateral right to rebalance pursuant to the last clause
of Article 8.3, it must similarly say so.) We would, however, limit
this right to those instances in which the Member imposing the
rebalancing measures challenges the safeguard measure through
the WTO's dispute settlement regime. Under these terms, if a
Member chose not to challenge the underlying safeguard
measure pursuant to the DSU (supplemented by the new
safeguard-specific dispute settlement provisions set forth below),
207 We recognize that GATT Article XIX:3(a) provides for the same ninety-day
restriction, which would therefore also need to be adjusted. This would be as simple as
removing the clause "not later than 90 days after such action is taken" from Article
XIX:3(a).
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it would give up its rights under the second clause of Article 8.3
to rebalance sooner than the three year anniversary
contemplated by the first clause of Article 8.3.
In order to accommodate this approach, and to ensure
protection against unfettered use of either safeguard measures or
rebalancing measures, significant additional adjustments must
also be made to the Safeguards Agreement with respect to the
dispute settlement procedures to be followed. Specifically, in
order to ensure protection against prolonged imposition of either
illegitimate safeguard or rebalancing measures, the deadlines by
which certain events must occur during the course of dispute
settlement must be significantly accelerated. After all, if no
adjustment is made to normal dispute settlement procedures, a
final decision on whether a safeguard measure conforms to the
provisions of the Safeguards Agreement could take as long as two
years or longer from the day on which consultations are first
requested. 2 08 This would give Members carte blanche to impose
either illegitimate safeguard or rebalancing measures for two or
more years. Given the clear intent of the drafters to prevent
such an occurrence, the normal and relatively lengthy dispute
settlement process fails to accommodate.
Adjustments to the dispute settlement timeline can be
performed in the context of the Safeguards Agreement itself; they
do not necessarily require amendment to the DSU. Such an
approach was adopted by the drafters of the SCM Agreement for
disputes involving prohibited subsidies, for which dispute
Specifically, the
settlement is significantly accelerated.
timeframe for consultations is cut in half; the panel's report is
due to the Members within 90 days from panel composition
statistics,
available
at
208 See,
e.g.,
World
Trade
Law,
DSC's
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dscdstats.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). There are plenty
of examples of disputes taking longer than two years to resolve. Worldtradelaw.net
calculates that from the date of panel establishment to adoption of an Appellate Body
decision, the average is 549 days, or about 18 months. However, this excludes the time
between the consultation request and establishment of the panel, which takes at least
sixty days, putting the average at twenty or twenty-one a month. Meanwhile, if this is the
average, then obviously there are multiple examples of disputes taking even longer to
resolve. Indeed, a recent dispute - which was never even appealed to the Appellate Body took 1180 days (nearly 40 months, or 3.3 years) to resolve). European Communities Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291, 292, 293
(July 27, 2004), concluded that since the European Communities failed to identify any
dispositive technical or scientific issues, the EC's Final Position served as further
confirmation that there would be no need or value in consulting with experts.
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rather than 330 days; and the Appellate Body's report is due in

thirty to sixty days rather than sixty to ninety days. Indeed,
given this schedule, we could envision a wholesale adoption of
the procedures used for disputes involving prohibited subsidies.
Consider a comparison of the normal and prohibited subsidy
timelines:
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AVERAGE
TIMELINE209
Day Event

NORMAL
Days
until
next

PROHIBITED
TIMELINE210
Day Event

SUBSIDIES
Days until
next
event:

event:
Normal
DSU
0
60
130

Request for
Consultations
Establishment
of Panel
Composition

Prohibited
Subsidy
Schedule

Schedule
60

0

70

30

245

100

of Panel

Request for
Consultations
Establishment
of Panel

30
70

Composition

90 (until

of Panel

circulation
to
Members)

375

Interim

55

Interim

Report
430

Final Report

Report
30

Final Report

to Parties
460

490

Final Report

to Parties
30

190

Circulated to

Circulated to

Members

Members

Notice of

90

220

Appeal

580

AB Report

30

Notice of

60

Appeal

30

280

Circulated

610

Final Report

20

Circulated

Adoption

Assuming these numbers

AB Report

300
-

Adoption

based on averages

-

are fair,

adoption of the prohibited subsidy schedule would appear to cut a
209 Timelines based on averages from www.worldtradelaw.net (last visited Apr. 11,
2008). Although specific deadlines are set forth in the DSU (Articles and both panel and
Appellate Body working procedures, certain events have no deadlines (e.g., establishment
of a panel following un-defined period for consultations; composition of panels is also
undefined), and even the hard deadlines can be negotiated. Hence, the use of averages is
the best estimate of the time a dispute will take to resolve.
210 Timelines here are based on a combination of SCM Agreement deadlines (Articles
4.6, 4.8, and 4.9) and averages from www.worldtradelaw.net (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
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typical schedule by half, and result in a panel decision in just
over six months from the day the dispute is triggered (i.e., the
day consultations are requested), compared with fifteen months
for a normal schedule. Meanwhile, final adoption of a decision,
including the time for an appeal to the Appellate Body, would
occur in about ten months rather than an average of more than
twenty months for normal cases.
However, and importantly, we would propose to go one step
further. Consistent with the injunctive relief notion discussed in
the previous section, a panel report issued in accordance with the
accelerated schedule set forth above would serve as the trigger
either to justify or reject the imposition of rebalancing measures.
In other words, if the panel disagreed with the challenge to the
safeguard measure, the panel report would essentially serve as a
ruling for injunctive relief against continued rebalancing
measures. If, on the other hand, the panel's decision confirmed
the challenge - i.e., that the measure was inconsistent with the
Safeguards Agreement - the rebalancing measures could remain
in place. And, if the challenging Member had not yet imposed
the rebalancing measures, it would permit them to be imposed
immediately thereafter. The panel decision would not yet require
the Member imposing the safeguard measure to remove the
measure (this would be handled as it is currently), but it would
confirm the validity of the rebalancing measures.
Under this approach, imposition of such measures could occur
either immediately after the request for consultations (and
notification of the rebalancing measures) or immediately after
the panel report, which would issue approximately six months
after the request for consultations. This way Members maintain
their right to immediate but not unfettered rebalancing, but also
have the option to delay imposition of such measures until the
panel's accelerated dispute settlement schedule is completed. We
think this approach accommodates the intent of the drafters as
well as the interests of both Members imposing safeguard
measures and those imposing rebalancing measures. It places
Members on equal footing, as neither safeguard measures nor
rebalancing measures would be permitted to stay in place
unfettered for longer than six months. This would, meanwhile,
serve to expedite the resolution of disputes.
If, on appeal, the Appellate Body reverses the panel's decision,
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and finds that the safeguard measures were not inconsistent
with the Agreement, then the rebalancing measures would have
to be removed immediately, and could not be imposed again until
the three year anniversary of the safeguard measures plus
whatever amount of time the rebalancing measures were in place
prior to the Appellate Body's decision. If the Appellate Body
upholds the panel's decision, the rebalancing measures could
remain in place until the safeguard measures are removed.
Of course, this scheme could also lead to concomitant disputes
over the appropriate level of rebalancing. Rather than leave this
un-policed, as is arguably the case currently, a provision could be
added to Article 8 of the Safeguards Agreement that would (a)
refer Members imposing rebalancing measures to the hierarchy
and standards set forth in DSU Articles 22.3 and 22.4, and (b)
allow the Member imposing the safeguard measure to challenge
the rebalancing measures before an arbitrator under the
procedures set forth in DSU Article 22.6.
CONCLUSION

Though the intent of Article 8, as currently written, makes
sense to us and can be maintained as is-assuming our
interpretation is adopted-we think the safeguard mechanism
will be improved dramatically if the adjustments we suggest are
By clarifying the manner in which Members can
adopted.
rebalance, accelerating the dispute settlement process for
challenging safeguard measures, and creating a formal injunctive
relief device, the application of safeguard and rebalancing
measures would prove more predictable and the entire system
Whether this increases or
would become more legitimate.
decreases the extent to which the safeguard mechanism is used is
not our concern; the point is to better meet the overarching WTO
goal of providing security and predictability in the multilateral
trading system.

